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THE PHILOSOPHY OF DF.SCAR~ AS .A. JlETllOD OF ASSURAllCE 
Introduction 
The great, questions of life have made man pbiloaopbers. While 
the traditional task 0£ most philosop~ bas been one of synthesis and 
clarification, it has shown a remarkabl1' persistent interest in the 
problem of certainty. Perhaps that 1a why the 1ndividual philosopher 
has al~ been so eager to set down a •sys~• 11b1ch is to become 
the be-all and end-all or metapbyaica. Bo thinker bas succeeded in 
accomplishing thia task. We ~ say that the problem is one of 
1.Jnense difficulty since it involves innmaerable corollar;y questi~. 
What is the nature or man? Vihat is the nature ot his tbjnJdng pro-
cesses? To what extent can be know the material worldJ What ia his 
destiny? And if we·want accurate annc,n., ~ ought not start 
with any presuppositions whatsoever. However, the very nature of 
tl).ought makos certain presuppositions necessar.r. Aa a matter or tact, 
evep. the wording or. our questions may imply certain presuppositions. 
It 1a this fallacy in our quest for certainty that SusfUllle Langer 
points to when she sayss 
Everything has become what it isJ everything has a cause; 
every change must be to some endJ the world is a thing, md 
IIIU8t have been made by some agency, out of some natural 
aturr, tor some reason. These are natural ~ of tMnking. 
Such implicit •wqs• are not avoad by the awrage man, but 
simply followed. He is not consci~ of aasunaing my basic 
princip1es. They are what a OermlD would call Ida "Weltan-
acbauung•, his attitude ot mind, rather than apecitic art-
1 
-
icl.es ot faith. They constitute his outlook; they are 
deeper than facts he may note or propositions he mq 
moot. · 
~t, though they are not stated, t.hey find upreas-
ions in .the FQRm OF HIS Q~IOllS •. A question is · 
really an ambiguous proposition; the answer is its de-
termination. The~ can be only a cert.ain !umber of 
alternatives that will complete i~ sense. 
2 
The~e few thoughts serve to emphasise the many stumbllng-etones 
along man•s search for assurance. Despite the stumbling-stones there 
~ve been many great 100n who have made the search. Rene Descartes was 
such a man,. one dec:apzy interested in certainty. He humb~ announces 
that he •never conte~ted anything higher ~an the reformation ot 
. ·my own opinions, and basing them on a foundation wholly uq Oll!l.•2 
?lonetbeless, Descartes does have a system, and one be sincerely be-
lieves valid. Although it is true that IDIIDY have found i'ault with 
Descartes calling his proofs tor the ¢stence of God doubtful, and 
bis understanding or the relationship of mind and matter fallacious, 
be i8 worthy of study because or bis contribution tq the doctrine ot 
certainty. It is the purpose of this paper to diacqss Descartes• 
philosophy as a method of certainty. 
l. Susanne· Langer# PhilosopbY in a New !!l, PP• 1, 2. 
2. Rene Descartes, Discourse. ~~, P• 13 .. 
-
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I. Status or Thought a't· the Time or Descartea 
Coming into the wo1·ld fifty years e.tter the death ot J&art1n :Wtber• 
Descartes was born into the titanic struggle betliaen the old world and 
the new. The age 0£ the supremacy of the Roman Church bad passed. It. 
1188 a period or adjustment to the new world of Protestant thought• or 
the emancipation of the human spirit. Three general currents or thought 
characterize the late sixteenth and the earq seventeenth centuries. 
These are the counter-Retomation with 1ta remants of Scholastic thought, 
the attitude or scepticism stemming tram the Renaissance, and the develop-
ment ot science. Let us consider them separateq. 
We begin with the counter-Reformation. ~ enough it was a 
goneral council, something long opposed byr.popes lrhich most assisted in 
the rovival of the Roman Church after ·the Retormation. Pau1 III. a1'ter 
much discussion• was prevailed upon by Charles V to issue a call for a 
general council to take place at Trent. Paul had diplomatic reasons for 
the 4ecision. He wanted to prevent Charles !rm ~aline with the problems 
himself. The two principal. purposes o£ the council wre to deal with 
doctrine and reform. The problem or the settlemnt of dogma arose about 
the time ot the Religious Treaty at Augsburg in l.SSS. !be matter of 
reform was a problem that reached back into the middle agea. 
The reactionary party represented by caratra and the Jesuits 
triumphed over the more evangelical Catholics. Tradition as affirmed 
as a source of knowledge and 1188 given equal authority with the Scriptures. 
Taking courage £rom Char1es, apparent victories in the Smalcaldic ware, 
the council reestablished the old doctrines with scarcely arq moditicatiom. 
-
Because of t he authority or Augustine, the 'lboraiats maintained a alight 
superiority over the nOiilinaliata. Thomism became the accepted standard 
or dogma in the Roman Catholic Church. This did not mean that other 
outlooks 11Cre discouraged. New ideas, with certain qualifications,. were 
welcOQOd, and the scholastic traditions 11Bre allowed to continue. This 
was especially true in the schools or the Jesuits. Because ot the re-
vival of Scholaoticism after the Council or Trent, we must exaa1ne same 
I 
or the characteristics or the Scholastic movement. 
, 
Scholasticism had, on the llhole, supported the pretensions of the 
church. But it haci. not been so docile a handrna1den aa is commrn,Jy 
alleged. There were som who could not reconcile their philosophy wi t.b 
the established Roman dogma. Weber notes this wapardness in t.be 
Scholastic movement when be writes1 
The more familiar ,.a become with scholastic literature, 
the less apt we are to exaggerate the progress or tree 
thought from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries. 
The historians who endeavor to trace all modern negations 
to tho Reformation, ignore, or attect to ·ignore, the fact, 
that in the ninth century tbe Catholic Sc;otus Erigena 
~nied eternal punishment; that in the twl.tt,h, the Cath-
olic Abelard declared the teachings of the Greek philo-
sophers to be superior to those or the Old Testament.; 
that in the thirteenth, a great~ of Catholics re-
fused to balieva in the mraculous conception and in the 
resun-ection or Christ; that in the same century, or two 
hundred )'laars before the Reformation,. and at the time 
When the power of the no~ See W88 at its ~ight, St. 
Thomas and Duns Scotus found tbemSelves obliged to prove, 
111th all the arts 0£ logic, tbe need of revelation and 
the credibility of the Divine WordJ fin&JJy that these 
submissive, devoted and orthodox doctors of tbe church 
combined with their Christian convictiODB a treedan ot 
thought the like of which is but rare~ 111Bt with in1 the Protestant theology o1' the aevanteanth century. 
1. Alfred Weber I Hiatory ,!?! PbilosoPl\Y, P• ].96. 
s 
Of course, Weber writ.ea with a biaa. Be tails to see \bat. 1lb1l8 
Scholastic thought often differed troa the traditional dogma ot ta 
Roman Church, that it had to exercise tbia •tree thought• such as 
it was, •underground". VJhat then of these theologians? They were 
~ound and could advance very little before they were stopped by the 
church authorities. Veitch correct,]¥ observesa 
Scllolast,icism l'mS a body of thought remarkable tor 
its order and sytlOOtry, 11ell lmit and squared, solid 
and massive like a mdieval fortress. But it was inad-
equate as an expression and representation or the tree 
lire that was working in literature, and even in out--
aide nascent phUosopby at the t1me.l 
Furthermore, Scholasticism like a house divided against itself 
lacked the vigor to break the bonds llhich held it captive. It re-
mained for the secular thought of the Renaissance and the religious 
thought o~ t,he. Reformation to accoq,ljab that. This want or vigor 
·1s traceable also to the very nature ot Scholasticim. Scholasticima 
was within the church, and yet found itself unable to accept the taith 
ot the church. The efforts of the Scholastics wre in the direction 
or proving their faith. But faith ceases to be faith when one llllch 
prove it. Usuall;r, the very term faith implies the acceptance ot 
something ·which is not demonstrable. i'Jhen the Scholastics employed 
• 
reason in the manner in which Anselm, Aqulll&S and Scotus employed it• 
one is moved to say that the religion of faith is no !301"8. Weber, 
recognizing this 11eakness in the faith ot St. ThOIIU • therefore pert-
inently observes: 
In st. Thomas Scholastic pbilosopl:\Y sb:inea lli.t.h ~ 
light before which the moat illuatr.loos names pale. His 
de"9'0tion to ttie church and Ua intereeta, bis pblloaophic 
1. John Veitch, .!!!! PbiloaopbY _!! Descartes, P• 7. 
talents~ which ha eJll)lO)'B 1n the service ot C&tholicln, 
and his faith in the perfect harmony bet.wen the dogma 
and philosophic truth as set tortb by Ariatotle, mak8 
him the most typical doctor ot the church atter st. 
Augustine and s.t. Anselm. But his faith~ ardent though 
it was, did not possess the strength of an unabakabl.8 
conviction; it is rat.her a willed faith., an energetic 
will constantly struggling against a thou.s~d ditfi• 
culties which reflection throws in ita ~· 
6 
Thia innate ~almess never disappeared in Scholasticiam. That 1a 1lby 
it failed to make a mark upon secular tbink1ng.. Though its basic 
tenota were preserved in and through the counter-Retormation, Scho-
~c though~, at tho time of Descartes, was all but insignificant 
out.Gide th? ch~c~. It must not be overlooked, however, that Scho-
lasticism left 2!!!. important legacy to the Rena1aaance development. 
Its emphasis on the po11er of reason left its mark on the Renaissance 
man. Even though,, from the Scholastic point of view, Renaissance 
minds distorted the capacity of reason, yet the tact rema:tus ; . reason 
with them.., as with the Scholastics, was ot utmost importance 1n 
ascertain1ng truth. 
Another current of thought evident at the close ot the sixteenth 
century, was the scepticism which surrl:ved Rena1BADce thought. The 
Renaissance was a period of transition tram the medieval theological, 
to the modern scientific interpretation of reallt,y. 1, stressed man 
and his place in the universe. It 1188 a reaction againat the con-
temporary standards of tbinJdng and a reversion to ·ancient cultures 
in an ei'f'01.~ to escape medieval.ism. Its appeal to classic civilizations 
had an influence on art, literature and customs. At. the same time, 
however,. the Renaissance was bred on a certain scepticiSm. It doubted 
the validity or the cultus 1n wllich people found themNlves. !he 
7 
French thinker, Uontaigne, for instance, doubted the poss1b111ty 
ot certain knowledge and SU&.,IJ'8sted a return to nature. There was 
a drift away froza the authority or the church wbich, through art 
and letters J influenced even the church itself. The same scepticism 
which pervaded th0 Uenaissance moV81iJ9nt infiltrated into the church 
itself finding root even in the lives, conduct, and attitudes of 
the clergy. Such an attitude, so all-pervasive left its legacy ot 
scepticism and doubt for cany years following. TbiB attitude 0£ 
mind p~ed a domnant role in the tb1~ng ot people ~g the 
age of Descartes. · 
Still another current of thought which dominated the period 
ot Descartea• activities was the rise· of the new science. Ini.ti-
ated by Coperaicus, Kepler and Galileo it readily became a habit 
of thought among the learned. The science or Copemicus gave the 
· world a new o{itlook. It .focussed attention on the law ot parsi-
mony.,. i.e., that the simpler expl.anation is the more reasonable. 
It gave status to the hypothesis and brought the entire ezperi-
. mntal idea into popular esteem. This provided another road which 
promised certainty. Otber mn soon followed. Using the experi-
mental method, Galileo was able to confirm the theory or Copernicus. 
It is important to distinguish two £actors in this new science, as 
evidenced both in Copernicus and Galileo. Name~ the difference 
bet119en the actual eq,loyment of certain JD9thods in the solution 
ot it.he problem ·and the description or those methods. Hort.brup . . 
deacribes the methods or both CopendcuS and Galileo thuaa 
·,u rzLAFF MEMORIAL LlBRA.l(l 
COM ·, i" ' ttA st-:"\lNARY 
~T. LOUI~. MQ. 
First, the discovery by analysis ot the basic 
theoretical root or the problamJ aeconc:l, the MlA9ct1on 
of the simplest phenomena ah1bit1ng the factora in-
volved in the difficultyJ third, the 1nductive ~ 
servation of these relevant tactoraJ toarth, the pro-
ject,ion o£ relevant bypot.hesea auggeat.ed·by t.he nlnant. 
f'actsJ fifth, the deduction ot logical consequences 
trom each hypothesis, thereby permitting it to be put 
to an experimental testJ s~, the claritication of 
one•s initial problem 1n the light ot verified IJn><>-
thesisJ and. seventh, the generalisation ot one•s 
solution by means of a pursuit ot logical implications 
of t~ new concepts and theories
1
111 th ~pect to other 
subject matter and applications·. 
8 
Northrup is here describine the met.hod used by these t1lo men. It 
is to bo noted that, this method 1s akin, almost exact:cy' the same 
as that employed by modern sciences. So 1118 can say ot the new 
· science that it was truly scientific 1n t.hat it employed methods 
almost equivalent to tbs best 1118 lmow today. How h~, as we 
haw noted, we must distinguish method from DF8CRIPTIOH ot method. 
Northrup bas nice]¥ analysed the ·method employed by the DBW science. 
However, this descriptive material is still coq:,aratiftly recent. 
An understanding by the scientist of Descartes I day of the •thod 
he used, why it produced good results, or failed raise~, was not 
to be had. So we ma:.,r sa::, of the new science, that 1lbile 1t achieved 
remarkable successes, it was at.ill groping. 'ftle reuon why it 1188 
unable to clearly see the way before it was the profound lack of 
~ic descriptive material which would provide clue as to 
scie~tirie I:Jethod and procedure. 
These then, are the primarY currents o£ thought evident iJ1 tbs 
age or Descartes. To repeat, t11q were the counter-aerormation with 
1ta remnants of Scholastic thought, t,he sceptical attitude arising 
rraa the Renaissance and the davelopaent of the Dff science. 
-
9 
II. · Descarteat 'Inf'luencea on tba Man 
It is always difficult to anaqN the elementa llbich make a 
man what he is. I£ he has written a great deal it becomes an easier 
matter. From the writings or Descartes it iB not ditticult to mark 
out some or the principal factors which influenced hill.· · 
We find in tr.is sixteenth century philosopher, first of all, a 
strong faith in the validity or reason. 'l'his faith appears to be 
intimately connected ldth the attitude or scepticism inherited £ran 
the Renaissance~ echoed in tho period during which he worked, and 
described in t.11e previous chapter. He bad become sceptical or all 
forms of knowledge v-lth the possible exception or mathematics. This 
081:18 scepticism shows itself in his mthod, llberein he makes a posi-
tive ei'for·t to doubt everything llhich he had formerly accepted as 
t,ruth. But c2midst this general sceptic1ea he preserves his taitb 1D 
· . the validity of reason. lfe feels that here (in reason) there is the 
onzy antidote for the pretenses of thought and the fa]] acies natura1 
to our thinking, which clutter our mind. Bis experience with various 
forms of learning had made him scoptical ot their worth. There was 
left to him a profound faith in the validity of reason. Therein are 
two primm.-y characteristics oi Descartes' thought. 
Another profound im"loonce on Descartes was bis interest in 
IDatbematica.. He saws: 
I was eapociall;y delighwd 11'.i.th mathamatics~ on 
account of the certitude and evidence ot their rouonsJ 
but l: had not as yet a precise Jmoll].edge o£ their tne 
use~ and thinking that. they but contributed to tbD 
mechanical arts, I was astonished that toundationa 
so strong and sure shoul\bave no loftier super-
structure reared on them. 
This interest in mathematics arose out or the scepticiBm which 
influenced him. He saw, as he says,, that in mathematics he had 
lD 
a solid foundation. All his doubts could not alter the simple 
-truths of mathematical demonstration. Furthermore., ma.tbematica 
provided a s ·~riking aretir:JGnt fm .. bis i'aith in the validity ot 
reason. lie felt that in ma.thematics, we have the purest example 
or the exercise of human reason. Because mathematics tbua pro-
vided him 1'li th a foothold against absolute scepticism and because 
it demonstrated the validity or reason thus employed in such a 
pure form, Descartes lmew that here was b1a clue in the quest, tor 
certainty. Burtt observes., "Descartes·• eagerness tar certainty 
' . . 
and for effective demonstration was the main motiw behind bis 
interest in mathematics.112 
Later "'° ·Ifill discuss the influence of science on Descartes• 
I 
But while we are still on the subject of his interest 1n mathematics, 
• might add t.'1at it-,ms through mathematics that Descart.es was 
lead to science.. As a matter. of fact, his principal SCIEtrID'IC 
achievement lmS the di;~owey oi ~ic ge<mietry. 'l'hia show 
the importance of mathematics upon the thought or Descartes. 
. . 
. Fullei• points out t.he fact t,hat matbsmatics. played an important 
role in Descai-tes, science., •Like Leonardo and Bacon, Descarte8 
bad a vision of. the novel scientific method .and perceived the 
l. Bene Descartes, Discourse on Ma~• 7. 
2. Edwin Burtt, Types .§! !@Iiif oua CJPb.y, P• 176. 
11 
fundamental role that mathemtics lraS_ top~ 1D sc1entif1c investi-
gation and in the formulation of scientific bypotbeaea • .i '1'bus the 
iq>ortance or ma.thematics to Descartes• seience. I.at.er w will see 
the fundamental role mathematics played in the formulation or Des-
cartes• metaplzy'sics. So• mq say tbat one or the cb1et intluences 
on the thought of Descartes was mathnatica I because it provided him 
with hope against scepticism, faith in-t.he validity of reason, a 
ground for certainty, and the foundation tor bis science and bis 
metapeysics. 
· How we would lll-e to consider another major intluence on the 
thought of Descartes, namely the new science. Of course, Descartes 
waa not a scientist in t.ho modern sense or the word. But be 1188 a 
scientist nevertheless. Weber points outa 
Descartes not 01'll;, uses imler obaervationJ he is 
a learnod anatomist and peysiologist (so far as that 
iras possible in too seventeenth century), and as such 
appreciates the value or experience. He loves to 
stu<t7 the GREAT BOOK OF THE VIORLDJ and for ~e to 
oppose him to Bacon on this point is sheer ignorance. 
The most recent histories of eartesianism jua~ in-
sist that it is iq>ossible to separate Delcartes the 
scientist from Descartes the philosopher. 
We have said that despite the point Weber makes, Descartes is not a 
scientist in the modem senae. The mathematical 8Jll)basis in science 
was not symbolic for Descartes, but rather offered him a reliable 
•thod, the rationalistic deductive mat.hod with which to work. 
Lindaq 8&pl 
. . 
Descartes lived iD times that saw the beg1nn:lng 
of modern philosophy and himself' contributed as much 
u anyone to those beginning8• Though without the 
1.. B. A. o. Fuller, Histo~ of Philj)S~, f:~S9. 
2. Alfred Weber 1 His§ri = ffiuosop!V . P• ~;,• 
experimental genius of Galileo and forriceW., be far 
more than Lord Bacon bad an insight into the theoret-
ical basis upon which the new discoveries rested. Hie 
great contribution to science was mathemat1cal. He 
was al~ more concerned with general principles or 
method than wl'th the detailed work ot observation. 
His science is essentially rationalistic. Just tor 
that reason., his scientific work is tilled with the 
most daring prophecies which became the aasumpticma 
of nineteenth century science • • • he . mainta1ned 
that the universe was a mechanical system and asserted 
this of the nature of the human bocv, and the whole 
nature of the animals as well as the structure ot the 
solar system. Qf late years scientific thought is 
becoming conscious of the limitations of this ideal. 
It involves certain theoretical impossibilities. But 
the serv-lces it has rendered to modern science cannot 
be over-cstil:lated.l 
12 
Perhaps the reason why Descartes as a scientist waa relative'.cy wi-
successi"ul. \\"0.3 bis firu belief that science arises troci philosophy. 
He himself did no·i want t o build upon foundaticms so infirm. One 
woul.d think that ainc0 ha felt philosophy should not be the basis 
£or science that he -muld find another basis, . But in this he tail.a 
as we shall sea when m approach hie meta~ics-. Ba is still the 
rationalist. He still IllU!lt start with a ms~ical principle from 
which all knowledge stems. He fails entireq.to see the value of 
induction as did Bacon, the value of the hypothesis, and the value 
of the empirical test of the Jm>otbesis. Just for this reason he 
. . 
fails t.o becoae ~ modern scientist. .At. the nm t:linie, hi& importance 
1n the .field oi' theoretical. science, p,s bis importance to tbe science 
ot his 01l1l ~, cannot be denied. Northrup iDeludes him in a list 
or ecien•ists who proved theaselvea to be· :such because · tbe7 11ent 
beYond the third stago of i.nquiry • . (See page 8.) 
An exaro·ination of mjor 1iestern philosopbera shows 
, tha~ ~ey .11ere f~t rate scientists be.rqre . they became 
l. A. D. Lindsay, Introduction to Everyman edition of Descartes, 
p. ix. 
philosophers~ Uoreover the science 1n which they wre 
expert uas always mature~ having reached the t.h1rd 
stage of inquiry where deductively dormul.ated theory, 
requiring concepts by postulation were introduced. 
This is true or I)egocritua• Plato., Aristotle,' Albert.us 
Magnus,' Desca1.--tes • Leibniz,' lfant and Alfred Uortb 
m:dtehcad to incluaa a contempora.-ey and mntion on:cy, 
a few.1 
13 
So I think \iC can count science· as it V&B known 1n the sixteenth 
century as one of the profound iru."luences ou Deecartes. & thought 
it aut£icientl3 important to give it a prominent place in hie philo-
sophy immedia:l:iely followlng bis proof for his own and Qodts existence. 
Another influence 011 Doscartos t philosophy ns his religion. 
Rene Descartes was a devout Catholic. However. he did not enjo,- the 
favor or the entire church; aa Lin~ puts it.a 
T't1e publication of the DISCOullSE made Descartes 
famous, but it also, in spite of his previous behaviour, 
made him an object of suspicion to the more extrome 
ecclesiastics, Calvinist and Roman Catholic alike; It 
was p2l""&icularly to ~ these suspicions that he pub-
lished i n 16Ll his MEDITATIONS ~ • ~ Their purport was 
to show t ri.at the new system of philosophy, in spite o! 
its fundamental difference from Scho1aa1.icin,. could 
produce irrefragaule argwaonts rem tbe most orthodox 
conclusions.2 
Porhaps i·i; wa.s for ti'ds same reason that Descartes wrote at the end 
or his PRINCIPLESi 
I submit all n-q opinions to the authority or the 
church. Lest I should prcfJ\J8! too tar I I attim nothing, 
but submit all these r.rJ' opinions to the authority ot the 
cbUl"Ch and ·the judgment of tho more sage; I desire no one 
to believe anything that I've said, unleaa he is con- 3 strained to admit it by the torce and evidence of reason. 
1. F. s c Northrup The ~ or the Sciences and the Humanities, P• 7. 
2.. A. »: Li.nds3'Y', 1ntro"aucllon'"toEver.,man ed!tion o1""1Jeicartea, P• x. 
3. Rene Descartes 1 Principles !!!, Pbilosop5t, P• 228. 
Such a statement and tl2llY others which one finds 1n the dedicaticma 
seem to indicate a lack or certainty on the part. or Descartes in the 
validi !,Y of hi~ system. This io .not nec~asarily the case• howner. 
He TIJJJ:f havo been protecting himself. The £act is he never denied . . . 
the pr-lnciples he laid clmm even thougl1 be often ran into dif'ficulty-. 
Descortes tl3S not of the ·stu.i'f that martyrs are 
made. 1i01"'8over he had a deep and sincere devotion 
to t he church· and respect ior its authority. Its 
condemnation was enough to &111'9 bis conviction of 
the truth of his conclusions. 
Descart.Gs• £ear of the hostility of the Church could not but innuence 
bis thought. This .rear perhaps accounts tor ):ds al.moat absolut.e 
dual 1 sm of bocy and mtter. Lindsay suggests & 
Hobbes had snid, •It is ldth the mysteries or 
our religion as with wholesome pills for the sick• 
which s\l<lllowed 1~hole have the virtue 0£ cure J bu.t 
chewed ars for the most part cast up without ett'ect. • 
Descartes had never thought .or chewiDg or 1n 
any va,.y ana.]Jrsing tihat his spiritual doctors pre-
scribod-. He was concerned to prove that such spiri-
tual proscriotiona wre necessary, and to just1ty 
that view oi the world on which they are basod. This 
was the source of Descartes• dualism. He bad to find 
room in his system for two entire'.cy' disparate worlds. 
He never really gave any explanation ot their connect-
ion e:tcept to s~ t."lat thoy ·~re both tbore and that 
their inter-comr;nmication was m.raculous. The sharp 
· separation \lbich he I!IDintainc-d botwaen them ~ 
e~ banurul to both. It pr~ced on1 the m.9. ~ 
bis conception o£ a pure'.cy' meeball.i.cal world which is 
the basis for modern materialism, and on the other 
band the beg-lnnings or that form of idealism 1lbich 
shuts the soul up within itself and tends to tbrolf 
doubt upon and even deny the existence o.r tbe external 
world of objects. For the soul conceived of as sep-
arate from the body there can be no object but itself, 
or ot a God separate from the world. flle soul •s 
lmowledge of the world ~comes a 11\YBter.Y which it is 
~ to go on believing.-
1. Lindsay, !?l?.• cit., P• ix. 
2. ~-, p.-13.-
lS 
Thus cartesian dualism rises from bis mutual interest 1n both science 
and religion and bis desire to establish the vallditq ot both. We 
shall deal core f'u11y with Cartesian dua)i sm in the conclusion ot this 
paper for it is integral in Descartes• quest far certainty. In any 
case: 
Descartes vas a practical Catholic all ot his 
life and he tried to develop proof's or tho existence 
ot God, an explanation of the Eucbarist,. ot the 
nature of religious faith, and or the operation ot 
diV'lne provldence' ring his pbilosophy as a basis 
for a new theology. 
What else need be said about Descartes the man? We have invast.i-
gated those interests and influences wbich moulded bis philosophy. 
Jlatbecatics, science, religionl These 1181'8 the three great branchea 
of learning that Descartes tried to synthesize and clarity 1n h1a 
philosophy. By doing so, he hoped to lead the world tram the chaoa 
and doubt into which it bad been led by Scholasticiam and establish 
for it a structure as well grounded as a geometric axiom upon which 
might be erected the superstructure o£ a new thought. 
l. Vernon J. Bourke, "Cartesianism, • Dictionary 2! Pbiloaopby, 
(Runes), P• 46. 
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III. The Cartesian Quest tor Certainty 
Descartes enters upon his pb1Jos'opbic speculation 1ri th an air 
or modesty. nAi'ter all," he says, •it 'l1Jlf1' be possible that I am. 
mistaken and it is but a little copper and glass, perhaps, that I 
take tor go-ld and diamonds. •1 He asserts that be is not offering 
an object-ive answer to the problems be attempts to solve. He rather 
affirms his subjective approach, 
By present design is not to teach the method 
which each ought to follow tor the right conduct 
of his reason,. but solely to describe the R1' 1n 
which -I have sought to conduct rq om ••• tb1a 
tract is put forth mere~ as a history,. or if you 
11ill, as a tale, in which, amid some eUJll)lea 
worthy of imitation, there will be found, perbapa, 2 aa many more which -it nre advieable not to,tollos. 
ife have alreaey mentioned how Descartes til"ed of the studies 
taught in his early Jesuitical surroundiDgs. One by one he exam1ned 
the various subjects tor study and 11tbe varied courses and pursuits 
of mankind at large,a and found scarcel;y one which did not appear 
vain and useless. He writes i 
I f'ound ~elf involved in doubts and errors,. 
that I was convinced that I had advanced no further 
in all 'fiIJ/ attempts at learning than the discovery 
at every tum or 'I!fi' om ignorance ••• I was thus 
led to take the liberty of judging all Jl8ll by 11q-
ae1t,. and of concluding that there was no science 
tn ezistenee that was ot such a ~Jture as I bad 
previoUB~ been given to believe. 
<me. is reminded in this· doubt of Deseartes, or Bacon's categorisation 
of all the things llbich mq be doubted under biS tour idola. Each 
l. Rene Descartes, Discourse ~ Method, P• S. 
2. Ibid. 
3. ?6Icl. -
stands for cei--tain popular misconceptions or beliefs 11bich muat 
conscious]¥ be denied bofore truth can be achieved. Ona sees a 
trace or tbis in Descartes, 
I learned to entertain too decidedJ¥ a belief' 
in regard to nothing or the truth of which I bad 
been persuaded oeroly by example and eu.stomJ and 
thus, I ~icated 1JJ3Self from ~ ·erroz-a po119rful 
enough to darken our natural indulgence, and 1D-
capaei1ite us in a great measure trm llsten1ng to 
reason. 
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Descartes wants to eJ:iminate these errors. Ha tells how he &111818 
•had an earnest desire to lmow how to distinguish true fraa false.• 
He tells us that this intense drive within h1a in addition to the 
feeling of in.adequacy l1i th which his various st.udies bad left him, 
prompted him to seek other recouroe~ 
For those reasons, as soon as ur:, age pemit~d 
m to pass from t.he control ot my instructors, I 
entire'.cy' abandoned the otu(\y of letters, and re-
solved not to se.::k any other s~d;y than Jl\YSGlr, or 
of the great book of the 110Z'ld. . 
• 
The subjects of studies t.hus far bad~ served to teach him 
habits of t,h~t and ideas which bad not been prawn. In tact, 118 
have these ideas smp~ because • 1'81"8 brought up 1n an enviroDmBDt 
of llbicb these ideas are a natural part,.. 1'herefore .he reels w would 
have been much better otr if-.. 1181"8 born 111th our intelligence· tul.:q 
matured. We would thereby not be subject to the custams and folkways 
of thougbir that so color our thinking. We ·IIOUl.d not t.heD be bound by 
•the chains forged by the free men of yesterda.Y • • In v1n of all 
this a Descartes makes a deciaion which is tbe starting point of his 
quest for certaintys 
l. Rene I>es-ca1~s, Discourse ,gg Met.hod, P• 9. 
2. ~., P• 8'!' 
• 
' . . . 
As for: the opinions · I had up to that time ea-, 
braced, I thought I could not do better than to re-
solve to s~ep them wholly away, that I might after-
wards be in a position to admit either others more 
correct, or even perhaps the same when they llad 
undergone the scrutiny 0£ reason .. l 
At another place he ~31 
I was thus lee! to infer that the ground tor 
our opinions is fnr I:JOre custoci than any certain 
knowle~oe • • • I could select from the crowd no 
one whose opinions seemed worthy ot preterence, 
and I thus found ~elf constrained, as it Wl'9 
to use ey ow11 reason in the conduct ot 'f!13' lli'e.! 
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In order to facilitate this method ot doubt he takes a i"urther 
step in desiring that all those things 11b1ch are cloubttul should be 
considered false. 3 In doing this he makes a conac1oua ettort to 
eJ1:rdnate from his mind all extran&oua materiAll and thua imnD'e a 
clear mind for tbe .foundation llhich must then appe,ar as indubitable. 
He sap, 
I am constrained to avow that there iB nothing 
at all that I formerly believed to be true ot which 
it is mpossible to doubt and that not through 
thoughtlessness or levity', but from cogent and 
mature~ considered reasons; so that hence£o~ 
if I desire to discover an;ytbing certain,,. I ought 
not the less refrain fro:ri conse11ting to those same 
opini~s tlWl llhat mgbt be shown to be manitea~ 
talse.4 
Thus he adopts a positive method of dc,.ibt applied to all things 1n 
t.he search for truth. 
Descartes cautions his reader that ·:;bis mthod of doubt should 
onl.1' be used in the contecplation of trutbJ it 1a dangerous to appq 
it. to the practicalr,problems or~ lite. Hor doea he want to be 
charged with scepticism. 
l.. Bene Descartes, Discourse !!! Method, P• 12. 
2. Ibid., P• 1.4. 
3. 'S'iie Descartes, Princie; P• l.6S. 
L. Bene Descartes, lidlG , P• 8) • 
• 
I made it fiI3' business in each matter to renect-
particularly on lfl1at might be d9Ubted and ·pr<mt a 
source oi' error. I gradual Jy rooted trora rq mind 
all error. which bad hitherto crept into it. Not 
that in this I imitated the sceptica who doubt on]3 
that they may doubt, and seek nothing beyond certainty 
itseli'; for on tho contrai7, ~ design "AS to rind 
ground for assurance, and I cast aside the loose cl.ay 
and sand, that I might reach the rock c,r clay. In 
't;hia it appeare to me that I was successful. enougb.l 
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With the descrip~'.ion or hi8 syatema.tic ottorta to doubt, Descartes 
begins one of the most absorbing and intriguing studies in phi].oaophic 
literature. lie proceeds to can-y bia plan into action, that is to 
doubt all that he has former~ thought to be true. In the first place, 
he found that he could doubt his sense experiences 
All that I have up to this moment accepted as 
possessed or the highest truth and certainty, I 
received ei thei" frooi or through '1111' sense. I ob-
served however that these sometimes misled •J and 
it is the part or prudence not to place absolute 
confidence in that by which we have e't'er been de-
ceived.2 
He is i\lr-lihe~ convi..nced or the deception ot his senses by bis ex-
periences in sleep.: 
But ! cannot f 01"get that at other tiiles I have 
been deceived in sleep by eMilar illusions; and 
attentively conBiderine these cases, I perceive so 
cle~:cy that there exist no certain iJarks by which 
the state of valdna can ever be distinguished fran 
that of sleep, that I feel great]3' astonishedJ and 
in amazement.,. I al.roost persuade ~lf' that I am 
now ~-rig.3 · 
However, even while dreaming "fMi1' seem to invalidate sense mcper-
ience, Descartes sees some possibility of reta1nine the validity of 
our sense experience, even despite the dream argument • . For be 8 8-Y81 
1. Rene Descartes, Discourse on llet.hoc:l, P• 23. 
2. Rene Descartes, Miidltatlona, P• Bo. 
3. ~., P• 81. 
Nevertheless., it tniat be admitted that the objects 
which ·appear to us in sleep are, as it were, painted 
representations of real objects which could not h&'fll 
been formed unlesR in the likeness ot realit1esJ and 
that therefore those general objecta at all e~ta -
eyes., a head, bands, and entire~ - are not simply 
imaginary bu·& really existent • • • For whether I am 
awake or dreaning1 it re?:lains true that two and three 
:!lake £i ve, and tlm t a square has four sides; nor does 
it seoa possible that truths so apparent can ever fa11 
under suspicion of falaity (or incertitude).l 
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So Descartes con·tinues in his attempt to see it it is possible justly 
to doubt sensible experience: 
As I s o:uetiues t hink that others are 1D error re-
specting matters of llbich they believe themselws certain 
and to possess a perfect knowledge, how do I know tbat I 
am not also decei vod every time I add together two and 
three., or number tha sidos of a squnre, or form some 
judgment still more simple, if more siJuple can indeed 
be i.naeined • • • I vil1 suppose then not that Deity who 
is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that 
some malignant demon who is at once potent and deceitf'ul.1 
has en;,loyed all of his artifice to deceive meJ I w1ll. 
suppose that the sky, the air I the eart.h, colors• figures, 
sounds, and all enternal things are notbing better than 
illusions or dreams, by means of wbicb this demon bas laid 
snares on my credulity; I will consider ~alt as llithout 
hands• eyes, flesh and blood or any ot the senses, and as 
falsely beli eving that I am possessed ot theseJ I will 
continue resolutely £ixed in this beliet and it by this 
means it be not in my powor to arrive at a knowledge of 
truth• I shall at least do what is in -eq pomrt< vis •• 
SU8pend judgment, and £,'Uar<i with settled purpoae against 
giving UI1f consent to dla.t is false, and boing 1mposed 2 upon by the deeei ver, whatever be his power and artifice. 
Up to now he has i'elt that matb.ematical. truths are indubitable. 
But in bis search for things to doubt, Descartes tells us that even 
mathematical . demonstrations fall beneath the same arguments which he 
'USed to doubt sensible thingsa 
We 'llill also doubt of the other thing we haw pre-
vious~ held to be certain, even of the demonStrations 
.or •thematics, and ot their l)l'inciplsa which we have 
bi therto deemed self evident.) 
l. Rene Descartes,. Hedi.tations, PP• 80-81. 
2-. Ibid., PP• 82-84. 166 
J. &iii· Descartes, Principles ,2! PbilosoPbf., P• • 
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It would seem that at this point, Descartes baa reached the cl.1max 
ot doubt. Here he has achieved t.he ultimate 1n acept1c1am, tor he 
bas doubted the validity of mathematical demonstrations. (Recent 
use of non-Euclidean geometries especially in connection w1 th new 
spatial concepts bears out what Descartes meant by the necesaifiT 
tor doubt.) 
Descartes f~ affirms that at leaat when wo have doubted 
all, l'lhat reaains will still be· absolutely certain, for it has with-
stood the ultimate test.1 Furthermore, the whole investigation, the 
entire experiment in the test of all experience with the sceptical 
attitude of mind, had yielded certain fruits. Descartes tella us 
sanething of these f ruitsc 
Since I endeavored to discover the falsehood. or 
certitude of the proposition I examined, not by feeble 
conjectures, but by clear and certain reasonings, I 
met wl th nothing so doubtrul as to not yield a con-
clusion of adequate certainty, although this wre mere]¥ 
the inference, that the matter in question contained 
nothing certain ••• In destroying such of '61T opinions 
as appeared ill-founded, I made a variety ot observa-
tions and acquired an amount of experience of which I 2 
availed t.J7Self in the establishment of the more certain. 
And so Descartes, while he bas gained valuable experience, and a 
feeling that sooe or his infonaation may be valid (that is it he is 
not being deveived by an evil demon},. he nonetheless is taced 111th 
the inevitable conclusion, that there is nothing certain, except, 
perhaps, that he doubts. 
I supposed accordingly t that all the things which 
I see are false (fictitious J J I believe that none of 
the objects llbicb rif:/' fallacious memory repre98nts ever 
l. Rene Descartes, Discourse ~ Wethod,-, P• 73. 
2. ~., P• 24. 
m.stedJ I suppose that I posaess no BenNBJ I beline 
that bo~., figure, extension, motion and place are 
mere]¥ fictions or my mind. What 1s there then i\bat 
can be estetmed true? Perbape
1
tb18. oaq, that then 
18 nothing absolutely certain. 
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And so Descartes I quest tor certainty ends OJU1' 1n the certainty ot 
uncertainty& 
1. Rene Descartes., Meditations, P• OS. 
23 
IV. Certainty tram Uncertainty 
It is t;ypicil of this uncanny Frenchman to find bis certainty 
rooted in the idea of uncertainty. But this is• after ill• no more 
unusual t.han his deliberate attack on all things considered tixed 
. . 
and cortain by t be popular mind. De3carws es-tablisbed t.hia idea 
as a fixed and inGvltable equation - by bis doubting, be is assured 
o£ his own existence. Descartes sayaa 
I had t he perauaaion that there was· absolute~ 
nothing in the world., that there "ft8· no sk;y or eart.h., 
no mind or bodies; was I not at the same J:lC1181lt ))81'-
suaded that ! did not exist? Far trom 1tJ I assuredly 
existed since I ns persuaded. But there 1s I know 
not what being possessed ot the greatest power and 
cunning, who is doubtless employing all his ingenuity 
to deweive me. Doubtless then, I .mdet since I• 
deceived; and let him deceive me as he ma,;y, he can 
never vr-'l..ng it about that I am nothing so long u I 
am conscious that I am something. Sot.bat it mwst 
be maintained., in fine, all things being -~ 
and carefully considered that this propositiCID I am, 
I exist., is ne~essari'.cy true each time I conceive 
it in my mind.1. 
Vie find a sitailar statement in the Discourse but with a better anal3ais 
or how assurance is derived !"rau the necessity of the th:Jnk:Jng or 
doubting process - the idea being that the fact ot thought or doubt 
establishes the necessar:, existence oi the thinker or doubter, subject 
and action being synorzymous and aitual'.cy necessary• 
I thought that I ought to reject as absolute~ 
false,, all opinions in rogard to which I could suppose 
the 1-east ground frC1J1 doubt, in order to ascertain 
whether after that there reEJa1Dad ought in 'llfl belief 
that was wholly indubitable. 4ccording~, seeing that 
l. Rene Descartes., Meditat1omr, p .. 86. 
our sense sometimes deceives us,- I was w1U1ng to 
suppose that there existed nothing rea].q such u 
they presented to us J and because some men err 1n 
their reasonings and fall int<> paralogisms, even 
on the simplest matters ot ge0Cl8try, I convinced 
that I was .as open to error as~' rejected as 
false all the 1~asoninga I had hitherto taken aa 
demonstrations; and f~, . when I considered that 
the ver;r same thoughts {presentations) that bad 
ever entered T1I',{ mind llhen awake, bad in them no 
more truth than the illusions of -rq dreams. But 
ilrcediately, I observed that, whilst I this ld.shed 
to think of all as false, it 'W88 absolute'.cy nec-
essary that I tmo thus thought,. should BE, some-
what; and as I observed that this truth, I think, 
therefore I am, was so certain &l)d of such evidence, 
that no ground of doubt, however · extravagant could 
be alleged by the skeptics capable of 8baldng it. 
I conc1uded that I could, without scropJ.e, accept 
as the first principle of the pbiloaophy ot which 
I was in sel\l"eh.l 
Later on Descartes describes this assurance JIOl"9 accurate]ya 
In the words, •I think, tbere&>re I am•, 'there 
is nothing at ·all which gives Iile assurance beyond 
this, that I see very clearly that in order to think 
it is necessary to ezist; I concluded that 'l might 
take tor a general rule, the priilcip1' that all 
things which we clearly and distinctq conceiw are 
true, only observing h011&ver, that there is same 
di.f'.fieulty in righ~ determining the objects which 
we clearly conceive. 
Furtb.e?'.filore, we have noted in the car~.:';J)ages of this paper how 
the form of our questions and our presuppositions may influence tbe 
alternatives we allow ourselves in the analysis of some aspect or the 
problem o£ truth. We 1dll note here that Descartes, who was a great 
theoretical scientist, by trying to eliro:biate from bis mind all pre-
suppositions (idols), is forced to find the source ot assurance in 
hisnown consciousness. So be arrives at the •Cogito, ergo sum.• 
1. Rene Descartes, Discourse !!! »etbod, PP• 26-27. 
2~ Ibid • ., P• 27. 
2S 
His presuppositions, that the existence of matter is doubttul, 
etc., are of such a nature as to incline his pbiloaopby 1n the directi~ 
of idealism rather than a dual1 sm. 'lh1s. ·general tendency in h1s philo-
sophy 1s faeilit.ated by the "Cogito, ergo sum .. • In tact, it is in his 
' 
exposition of the "Cogito, ergo sumn that he approaches lll08t closely 
this idealistic school; and it is in this direction, he reels, that 
. ' 
certainty lies. As a result, •he is extrem~ interested in the nature 
of mind. He affi:nns repeatedJ.¥ that 118 are much more ·certain of the 
existence ·of the mind than of the existence of the bocb'a 
And this is the best mode or discovering the nature 
of the mind and its distinctness from the bod;ya £or, ex-
amining what we are, while supposi.113 as • now do1. that 
there is nothing really existing apart from my own thought, 
we clearly perceive that neither extension, nor atgurej 
nor local motion~ nor anything s1m:i]ar that can be attri-
buted to body, pertaina to our nature• am nothing save 
thought alone; and consequent]J", tbat the notion we have 
of our mind precedes that of 8.fJY corporeal thill!b and is 
more certain, seeing• still doubt whether there ia any 
b~ ill ~'d.stenee while we alreadJ pereeiw that• 
think • .1. 
Since our mind is the chief thing even in the understanding of 
the material 1.1orld, it. is true that mind is more important. But even 
further•· the perception of the material world understood by -r:11' mind, 
is a token itself, of the md,stence o£ my minds this in refutation of 
the· Locldan concept that what is in the mind was first in our sensee. 
Perhaps 111e even find in this refutation of Descartes and other similar 
ones. a begirming or the Kantian criticism of Locke. lCant sees· the 
ultimate nihiliSI:1 of both the Lockian empiricism and Berkeley's sub-
jecti.ve idealism and suggests that while it is true that what is-in 
1. Rene · Descartes, Principles., P• 167. 
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the mind was first in the sense, still 1t 1~ .equa].q true that the 
m1nd is the necessary synthe~c agency~ the organisation ot the 
phenomena presented' to the senses. 
Even at his initial stages of inquiry into this phase of the 
problem (of' establishing the certain and indubitable), Descartes 
still retains his doubt,s about material things. All t.hat· he has ~ 
' 
work with is his thinking and tho corollar;y to that, his existence. 
I thinlc.,, therefore I am. It is perhaps even true, he reasom,• that 
all _ that he needs to insure bis existence IS mind. For he s~a 
li'rom the very circumstances that I sought to· doubt 
the truth of other things, it mu.st clear~ and certa:lo}y 
follow that I was, uhile on the other hand, if I had 
only ceased to think, although all the other objects 
Which I had ever imagined, had been in realit)T existen~ 
I -.ould have had no reason to believe that I existed. 
I thence concluded that I was a substance whose essence 
or nature consists oncy in thinking and llhicb~. that it 
may exist, has need or no place,- nor is· dependent on 
any matar-lal thincs, so that •1• that 1s to say, t.118 
mind by which I am what I am,. is who~ distinct £rem 
tl1e body and is even IilOre easily lmown than t.be latter, 
and is such, that though the latter }18re not, it would 
still continue to be all that it 1s.1. 
But does this imply that one exists only when one tbiolcat Descartes 
~ t "I aa, I exist; this · is certain; but how otten7 As often as 
I think, f or perhaps it would even happen if I should who1J1' cease 
to think that I should at the same time ll'h~~ ~ ·to be. •2'. We see 
then, how si3lrlfieant the consciousness-approach 1a to the philosophy 
of Descartes. Let us observe 001.'"8 in connection Id th our main thesis, 
nameq the stuczy- of tW.s man•s pbiJosopey as a ma.tbod or assurance, 
that the inevitable necessity for that assurance 1s grounded in the 
1. Rene Descartes, Princims, P~ 27. 
2. Rene Descartes, Ueclita ons, P• 88. 
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ego, in bis personal, subjectiw conaeiowmua. "What then aa I? 
A th1nldng being it has ~n said. But What 1s a thlnkln« being? 
It is a think that doubts, understands (conceivea), atnrms, denies, 
wUls, refuses~ that imaginea also, and perceiws.•l 
This thinldng object has ideas, or course, but those ideas are 
not. synonymous ·,vith their objects. Thia - see t'ram a passage in 
which there is perhaps a bit of the Kantian distinction between 
phenomena and noumena: "I have observ8d in a zmml>er of instances, 
that th.ere is a great diffe1'8llce between the object and the idea. 
Thus, for ex.m!!ple, :in ffJ3 mind, , I £ind wholly two dil'£erent ideas 
2 . . . . or the sun, etc.17 or course, Descartes here is talk1ng about an 
idea and an object. Dut since 'the mind (previous~ defined), also 
•perceiveon, its iclaa of an object is its percept,iqn ot it. Here, 
t.hen, Descartes is distinguishing between au object and our pe~ 
cept1on of it, without a.ffiradng that• can ever perceive the 
object in its entirety. 
But the mind very often can perceive mor-J ot frlA object than 
our ~onses ~,,. In support o£ the al?ility of the mind to pereeiff 
thinea ~ which the sonses misled us, Descartes ask8 us to tbiDk of 
a pioce or wax. In placing the wax in proximity of the fire, ever./ 
&ensib)e perception,. former]¥ ours, concernine the wax is changed. 
lt bas chanl,ed in regard to our sight, hearlllg, smell._ taste and 
touch of it. He concludes, nI ImJSt theref'ore admit that I cannot 
nan CQilprehend by im.gination what the piece ot wax ia and that it 
1~ Rene Descartes, Meditatioms, P• 89. 
2• ~ ... P• 99. 
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1a the mind alone uhich perceives it.•l .Deacat:tes suggests a~ 
another example: 
(Speaking or peqple •lk:Jng in t.be street below). 
What do I see from the window beyond bate and · cl.oaks 
that I!Iigh~ cover artificial macbinea whose mot.ions 
might be determined by springs. But I judge that 
there ax'E> human beines from ~ ~cee., and 
tJ.lus I comprehend, b'J the faculty of judgrimlt alone 
whic:h
2
is in ~ $d., what I Qelieve I say with JV' 
eyes. 
It is too bad that Deacai"'tea does not exa:adne the source of the 
precepts which determ:ine the mture of his judgnants. His earnest 
desire to separate t he mind f rom raaterial · things seems to make him 
go to au exiir ene to deny material tbinr;s, the· objects or bis sense 
experienoo. It is still true that h1s understanding of wax 1n its 
new .form as changed by warmth is still the result or experience with 
wax. And his judgment tliat those are genuine people in the streets 
1s based on experience too, on the many times he bas descended the 
stairs and mingled among tl'iem, indeed talked to them• shook hands 
.,.,_ th theQ, uaed ~s sense of smell to distinguish the fish pedlar 
from the aristocrati c debutante. But, I don"t think Descartes is aa 
guilty of going to the extreme in dei¢ng the existence ot material 
things as he aeems to be. He is still consciously doubting. lie is 
still intere~ted in absolute aoourance. and certainty• Thus even 
though his judgments of the objects ot sense experience are based 
on previous experience, it is still true that experience is not 
al~ true and valid; he 5: be deceiwd. 'l'heretare, be must dis-
cover .foundations more firm. These foundations he fi.nda in consciow,-
Lt Rene Descartes, Meditations; PP• 91-92. 
2. .!2!!!•, p .. 93.. 
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ws. Tho emphasis is, as I•ve ~aid~ on bis 1dea11ni. But h1a 
S deaJ i am ariaes only because bis COD8ciouanesa 1a harder to doubt 
12um material tllinga. But he is still interested 1n validating 
sense experience and the material 110rld. Far be points out that 
even DlVALID and incorrect sense experience in its interaction with 
bis imagination has sufficient i'orce to establiah his existential 
status as a 1"eal being. For he says s 
But flnally, Ydlat shall I say or tho milld itsel.r, 
that is, of !!zy'Self? for as yot I do not admit tbat I 
am anyt.hing but mind. \'Jhat thon1 I who seem to 
possess such a diot:lnct i:opression of a piece or ,ru; -
do I not know ieysell'? both Tlitb grooter truth and 
certitude, and also much more clear~ and distinctly? 
Foi• if I judge that a piece of ,rax exists because I 
touch it, it assw.-edly follows, much more evidentq, 
that I ~elf am or eJd..st. Far it is posoible that 
What I see ~ ,.. not be wa.1Z, and that I do not poBSeso 
even eyea wl th which to sec anything; but it cannot 
be that uhen I see, or, which COCl88 to tho samo thing, 
llhen I think I see, I IllV'Seli' who think am notbing. So 
likewi.ae, :lf I judge that wax exists because I see it, 
it will still also follow that I amJ and U 1113 imagm-
ation, or any- other cause whatever it may be, persuades 
me or the existence o£ wax, I will still draw the same 
conclusion. And l:bat is here 1"81i1Ql"ked of the piece or 
wax is
1 
applicable to all other thiDga that are azterna1 
to me. 
So in the midst of doubt, Descartes locates t.he island or security 
in an assurance o£ his ovm existence. He concludes•· 
I find that I am insensibly reverted to the point 
I desired; for_, since it is _now manifest to m., that 
bodies t,helilSeJ.ves are not proper]¥ preceiwd by the 
senaes nor UJ' the faculty or tl:Jo imagination, but by 
the intellec·t alone; and since they are not perceived 
because they .a1"'8 seen and touched, but only because 
they a..""e unde.""Stood (01• right~ comprehonded by thought) 
I refl(iiq discover that there is notlqng more easi~ or 
clear~ apprehended than ~ 01ffl mind.2 
l.. Rene. Desc~s, lted:1.iiationG,- P• 93. 
~.: Ibid., P• 91h . 
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Descartes• first great question bu bean1 Is there an ultimate 1n 
knowledge which guaranteea itself? By ~ doubting all thinea, 
by el :i m1nating from his thinking processes all ot those th1nga wbich 
WERE doubtt'ul, and by drawing th, one valid conclllaion froa the fact 
that he doubted, Descartes bas established a principle, which, tar 
him, satisi'if)s the 1"'equirements or both or these questions. Tbat 
principle; . "Cogito, ergo sum1n Wa have shown how this principle 
leads to au emphasis on consciousness and idealiat.ic philosophy. 
He now proceeds to his second big queetioni Ia this a suitable basis 
for a suporstl.-uc'cu.i.~ of knowledgel 
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V. Superstructures a Tbe Existence of Ood and Katter 
Descartes has affirmed that wbateftr 1e clear in the mind ie true 
and correct. However, he cautiODB us again and again to make sure that 
its clarity is as obvious as that of the •Cogito.• In the •Cogito•, 
there is an equation between "I think• and •1 am.• Tbeae two terms 
have the same validity as the equation that exist.a between two plus 
two and four. It is possible to form such an equation because •two 
plus two0 is nothing more than another form or •.tour•. So •1 think• 
equals, implies, inheres in, "I am". 
There is the same force in the ontological argument llherein the 
existence of God is derived .from our conception of him. It is a 
truth, an axiom which the soul perceives prior to reflection. 
There are several shades of meaning in Descartes• proofs for 
the existence of God. There is the purely ontological argument 
aspect - the proof that a God who is •a being than which a greater 
cannot be concei veda (Anselm) would not be such if be lacked exist-
. 
ence. This is an argument by definition. or as Weber points out, 
sometimes the emphasis in Descartes is notz 
God exists because rrq mind conceiwa himJ but, !ly 
reason conceives God because God exists. The true 
.foundation of our faith in God is not our conception 
of him, - that would be a subjective and weak basis, -
but God himself, who rev!als bimSelt to us in the . 
innate idea of infinity. 
I believe we can find both aspects of this proof in Descartes. Surely, 
the Prooi" by dei'ini tion is there, and surely the argument from our 
1. Alfred Weber, HistotZ !)! PbilosoA,Y, P• 247. 
iDn&te conception of t he infinte is there. Let WI first look at 
the argument based on God•s perfection. 
This perfection of God as contrasted with the imperfection ot 
' 
the human being is pointed out by Descartaae 1 
From reflocting on the circumstances that I doubted, 
and consequently on the cirClJIDStance that 'IV being waa 
not wholly perfect (for I clearly saw that it was a 
greater perfection to know than to ·doubt), I was led to 
inquire, whence I had thought to think ot something more 
perfect than. myselfJ and I clearly recognized that I 
must hold this notion from some nature that was ill 
reality more perfect ••• It but remained that. it was 
placed in rue by a nature oore perfect than nu own, and 
which even possessed within itself all the perfections 
of which I !llc3iY f or.n an ideaJ that is to say, in a 
single word, God&l 
Descartes gives us some picture or his idea of the perfect Gods 
Dy the name God I understand a substance infinite, 
(eternal, independant• imrautable, all-kncnd.nc, all-
poweri'ul, and by which I Iey"selt, and every other thing 
that exists, if any such there be, is created. But 
the'ae properties are so great and excellent, that the 
more at, ten ti vely I consider them, the less I .reel per-
suaded that tho idea I have or them owes ita origin to 
II\Y-8811' alone. And thus, it is absoluteq necessary to 
conclude, frOB all that I have before said, that God 
exists: £or though the idea or substance be ill uq mind 
owing to this, that I •elt am a substance, I shOlll.d 
not however, have the idea or an infinite subs~e 
seeing that I am a finite be1ng1 unless 1! 1191'8 given 
me .by some substance in reality infinite •. 
I clearly perceive that there is more reality in 
the infinite substance than in the finite, and there-
fore that in some way I possess the perception of the 
infinite before that of tbe finite, that is, the per-
ception o£ God before that of Iiij'Selt, for how could I 
lmow that I doubt, desire., or that something is wanting 
in me., and that I am not wbol:cy' pertect, ~ I possessed 
no idea or a being more perfect than ~self, b7 ·com-
parison of which I know the deficiencies ot m:I 01111 
nature?3 
l. Rene Descartes., Dis~ourse on Uethod, P• 28. 
2. Rene Descartes, ?Ieditati~ P• 164. 
3~ ~. 1 PP• 104-105 •. 
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Of course.,, out of the a.asump.tion or a pertect being Descartes 
concludes that this will not be a being 'Ibo 1s subject to doubt 
~ 
inconstanC'J 1 sadness and such lilm 41 Thia 1s concluded rather 
naively, because Descartes himseli' would be quite happy to be rid 
or such burdens •1 Furthemore, these unfortunate circumstances 
which Descarteo feels should not be ascribed to God are related to 
his own dual nature, that or mnd nnd matter~ "I theretore con-
cluded that it could not be. a perfection of God to be thus ~ 
pounded of two natures~ n2 Undsrutanding Ood in this W8¥ insures 
bis existence: 
I observed that the great certitude which by 
coanon consent is accorded to the demonstrations ( or 
ge0100try) is f ounded solely on this, that th97 are 
clearly conceived in accordance with the rales I have 
already laid dowt1. In tho next place I percoived that 
there was noth.ine in those demonstratiODS which could 
assure m o£ the existence of the object& thus, tor 
exaaple, supposing a triangle to be giwn., I cl.ear~ 
perceive that its 't..l1re0 angles are equal to t11> right 
angles,. but. I did not on that account perceive arv--
tbi?lg l'd1ich could assure me that a triangle oxistedJ 
llhile on t he contra...17, recurring to the oxarn::iMtion 
of the idea of a perfect being, I round that the 
existence of the Being was comprised in the idea in 
the same way t.."iat the equality of ~e three angles 
to two right angles is compriSed in the idea of a 
triangle • • • and that consequen~, it is at least 
as certain that God eriats (who ia a perfect being) 
as any demonstration in geometry can be.3 · 
Deacartes asks hi:i!ISelf whether he could exist wre there no God. 
If he did, he concludes, he would have to derive his axistence from 
•omething more imperfect than God since nothing more perfect than 
Ood can be imagined. Let us suppose that he himself is the cause ot 
l. Rene Descartes Discourse ob Yethod, PP• 28-29 • 
2 , -
• Ibid..• P• 29. 
3. m!•,, PP• 29-.30. 
his existence. But in that case he would be conscious at no de-
ficiencies for he would have bestowed upon himself _ever., quality or 
which he bad any idea and thus, as far as he 1188 able to judge, 
woul.d be perfect.1 
But perl1aps the being upon whom I am dependant is 
n~t ~d, and I have been produced either by JV parents 
or by saoo causes less perfect than Deit7. This cannot 
bes £or, as I have said., it is p,ri'ectli evident that 
the.re must at least be as !!Dlcb reality in the cauae aa 
in the effect; and accordingly since I am a thinking 
being, and possess within ivself' the idea of God, what-
ever in t.lie end be the cause of av m.stence., it mw,t 
of necessity be admitted that it 1a l.1kewise a tbirudag 
being_, and that it possesses in itself all the ideas 
and parfec·tions I attribute to Deity. Then it may be 
inquirGd nhether tlds cause owes its origin and m.st.-
ence to itself or to some other cause. For if it be 
self-eJdstent, it .follows tram what I haw laid dowo~ 
that this cause is GodJ tor since it posaesaes the 
perfectio11 of selt'-cxistence, it mu.st Uk,ewise without 
doubt, have the power of act~ possessing ever., 
ari'cction of which it nas the idea, - in ether words 
all the perfections I conceive to belong to God. But 
it it om its exist.once to another being than itself'• 
we demand again., for a similar reason:, wbether 'tbis 
second cauae exi~ts of its.elf' or tbrouch saae other, 
until f. om s~"6 to stage, m at l~ arrive at an 
ultimate cause, ,,,hi.ch will be .God.2 
You wlll soo hmr subtly Descartes becoaes representative ot the 
two ideas about God. That be exists because He is per!"ect and that 
He exists because of our idea ot things greater than ourselves. It 
is wry hard to separate these two ideas in Descartes. Let wr say a 
fe-w IIOrd.s now about. the second Cartesian concept ot God, that he re-
~ Himself' as perfect through implanting certain ideas 1n us. 
This idea or God is a remarmble thing. It is not derived tbr<>Ugh 
sense ·experience;, it is not a pure production or fiction of the miDd 
l.. · Rene Descartes,, Discourse on Hethod. PP•· l.<>6-107 • 
2.. . Rene Descartes., tlad!tatlona, P• iotJ. 
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since one can neither contribute to nor detract from the conception 
as it stands. The only o~r possible. s~ or t.hia knowledge or 
God is t hrough i."l."lato idea3 • By Dcm3 means God bad implanted· these 
ideas in U3 at creat ion as though the Daark of the flwarkman 1mpreased 
on his work. nl God r:mst have fashioned us after His own ~"'9 and 
likeness, " Qnd that I perceive this Jikenese in which is contained 
.the i~a of God.o2 
Des~s has not interested himelt· in enmining all of the 
arguaents which migbt be adduced in t,he proof ot Ood•s existence. 
He tella us quite clearly that llhat HAS co~cerned b1m was the proof 
which he consider s most valid, that it the necessity ot his existence 
from the f act of the capacity or the fini~ to conceiw the infinite. 
He feels .?urther that "there is no ay open to man llhareb;y proofs of 
more . suffi cient ce2"tainty can be discovered.•) Hor does he feel that 
even his proof is of suff icient worth to msrit the i.lllllediate con-
version of all men. Thi s ho feels• is not because of arq inherent 
fa.J.4C"J in t he proof but ooeause o£ cortain. unfortunate approacbos to 
the probleia in t he mind or the atheist. 
All tnat atheists commonl3 allege in favor or the 
non-existence of God arise continually i'rom one or the 
other o£ these tw things ·: name~, eitbor the ascription 
of human affections to Deity, or the undue attribution 
in our awn minds · of so much vigour ad ld.sdm tbat we 
essay to determine and coq,rehend lib.at God both can and 
ought to do; hence all tbat is allepd by ~· ~ 
cause us no di£ficulty provided only we keep 1n 1-~---
br!lllce that our minds mw,t be conaid::1 tWte lhile 
Deity is incomprehensible and :lnfillite. 
So the f orce of Descartes• argumant is tbia, that he could not 
be the ~ he is he could not have the thoughts he has if God did ' . 
l. Rene Descartes, Meditations, PP• 109-llO. 
2. Ibid. . 
3. Rene Descartes Discourse on let.bod, P• 67. 
1. , - . 
q. Ibid., P• 73. -
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not exist. This is guaranteed by' the principle that he, though 
finite, ia able to concoivo of the unchangeable, the immntable, the 
omniscient, the Olilllipotent, the infinite 1n such a manner as could 
only happen if his id.ea was conceived innately aa derived £ram God 
himself'. 
The existence of God proved, and the existence or himself 
established, Descartes next demonstrates how the existence ot God 
insures the existence of the material universe. Thia is the second 
superstructure. The idea of God •1a t.he perpetual refutation ot 
Skepticism. al And since God is perfect and not a ma.], gmmt devil, 
Descartes may be sure God would not de8'e1ve him as to the existence 
or the corporeal world. 
But after I have recognized the existence ot God, 
and because I have at the same time, recognised the 
fact that all things rest upon him and that he is no 
decai var, and in consequence ot that I have judged that 
a1l that I conceive cle'1'ly and diatinc~ cannot fail 
to be true • • • no opposing reason can be brought 
against Iil0 r.hieh should ever make mo call it into 
question; and thus I have a true and certain knowl.edge 
or it. And this same knowledge extends over all other 
things ·that I recollect having formerl,y demonstrated, 
as the t,rut.hs of geometry" and others like them • • • 
.And t,hus I recognize clear],y THAT THE CERTAINTY AND 
TUE TRU'Iil OF ALL KN07iLEOOE DEPEtID UPON THE KNOWLEDGE 
ALOME Oli' T"J:!E TRUE GOD: so that before I lmow him I 
could not perfectly lmow aeytbing el.S'e. And now that 
I lmow him, I have the iooans or acquiring a perfect 
knowledge of an infinitude of things• not onq or 
those which are in him, BUT AISO OF TlIOOE \1HICH BELONG 
TO CORPOREAL NATURE ••• ·2 
C8:l"l"Ying along this idea, Descartes 1'811inds us that prior to 
t.hia stage ot the argument he bad raised the problem. of dreams• 
Material objects sometimes appear in our dreaas with the force or 
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nal objects. How are 1f8 to distinguish the real from the ill.uaary? 
How are we to establish the ontological reality ot the material world? 
Descartes answers it in this fashion, 
Though men of the highest genius studif tb1a question 
as long as they please, I do not believe that tbey will 
be able to ei va sufficient reason to l'8IBO'l9 this doubt 
unless they presuppose tlle existence or God. For in the 
first place even the principle wbich I haw alrea~ t.akBn 
as a rule; vl~., that all thins& which 118 clear'.b' and 
~stinctly perceive are truej is certain ~ because God 
is or exists and io a porfect Deing; and because all that 
we possess is der-1 ved i'rora Himj whence it rollo,rs t.hat 
our ideas or notiow, which tQ the extent ot their cle~ 
ness and distinctness are real.; and proceed from God; are 
to that extent, true ••• But it we did not Jmow that all 
tJ1at 1.we possess of the real and true proceeds frcm a pe~ 
i'ect or infinite being, however clear and distinct our 
ideas IJa.Y be, we should have no ground on that account 
for t.hc assurance that they possess the pertection of 
being true.l 
So with the a£f imo.tion of Ood*s existence and the matence or the 
material universe, Descartes has begun the superstructure of h:18 
meta~ics. He has advanced confidently, tor he feel.a t.hat his 
reason has been his guide. 
In summary, we see that Descartes rinds certainty in llis om 
consciousness. Ilia own doubts wre sufficient to establish his 
personal existence. God and tho matorial IIOE"ld are deriwd there-
from. However, a part or Descartes• asuurance ot bis awn enstence 
is dsri ved froo the existence of God. 
Having aet up reason u a clear guide ror turtber action, 
Deacartes can begin dealing with science, or the lan 'llhicb govern 
the material universe. This is bis third great spperetructure. In 
h1a atu~ ha is just as interest.ad in certainV as be was in en-
1. Rene Descartes Discourse on Kethod, P• 31. 
' - ------
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deavor:1:ng to lay the foundations for a aolid ~tapbysics. Here• 
however, the eo~ ~s much ~re di.tficult. He ill involftd wit.h 
natural proce:Jses which must be investigated, con,cemiDg 11hich 
~otheaes must be advanced. Such hypotheses 11118t be tested and 
· retested and perhaps. restated in the light or new empirical data. 
Descartes, in o·ther words, now t1ll'D8 empirical scientist, trying 
to ferret. out uat,m.-e 's secrets and place upon them the same in-
signia of certainty that he placed upon Ontology. You will notice 
that the raetho~ must becoms quite different because of the nature 
. of the subject matter. Desca.rt.es • first method was one of' intro-
spection. llis second method was that or faith (a faith which pre-
served his ethical inteerity even wbile doubting all else). 'l'b1a 
really isn•t a "met.hod" at an, though it takes the place of one 
since it pi•ovides subjective certainty 1lhile the search tor objective 
certainty still ~oes on. 'lhe third method we have reserved for the 
next chapterJ that method concerns itael.t 11:ith the empirical 
approach to nature. 
Here we IilllBt remember all that 118 baw said about Descartes 
the mat.118matician and scientist. Former]3' be bad uauD8d that the 
s~ point of science was philosophy. Ue found upan mveati-
gation that pbiloaopcy was tar too UD.9table t.o support so lort.y a 
Sllper3tractw.--e as science seemed to be. So it is that Descartes 
having uoed mathematics,, or at least a mathematical method in 
establishing his introspactiw ~nation and nbjective assurance. 
now uses mathematics aa th& foundation tor science. So• ot Descartes 
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it~ be said that he laip. science upon a new starting point and 
recognized the importance ot that starting point. llm'9 than did 
either Bacon or Locke. 
He starts wl th an examination ot geometry and algebra and upon 
careful consideration finds them both entireq inadequate. Then, 
realizing that a combination of them would be ~ successful, 
be combines them. A study or the details ot tbia process is not 
possible trl.thin the confines of this paper nor· is it necessary for 
the purpose of this paper. Sufficient to a,q that Descartes estab-
lishes the existence of nature because or the existence of a per-
fect God and t hen proceeds to lay down the detm.led analysis or bmr 
further study is to be carried on. Tb1s turtber stud;y is summarized 
1n Descartes• four points of m&thod llhich ia briei'q examined and 
cri ticizod in this paper 1n order to show how the carteaian method 
of certainty applies in the physical universe. 
Jio. 
VI. Criticism and ~is ot Descartes• Foor Pointe 
We have said that Francis Bacon did not have the 1D81ght into 
the place or matheraatics in the future structure ot scientific thought. 
Nevertheless, he is one ot the fathers or induction. It might be 
interesting to compare some extracts from his Aphorina with the four 
points or Descartes: 
The logic now in use serves rather to gbe stability 
and to fix the errors which have their foundation 1n 
coIImO?(cy received notions than to help the search after 
truth ••• The syllogism consists ot propositions, pro-
positions consist or words, words are symbols of notions. 
There.fore i f the notions themselves (11bich is at the root 
of the natter) are confused and over-hasti]3 abstracted 
rro!:l the f acts, t.here can be no tirumess in the supez-
structure. Our only hope lies in true induction • • • 
There are aud ean be only two ways ot searching into and 
discovering truth. The one flies trom the senaes and the 
particulars to the most general axiOIIIB,- and trail these 
principles, the truth of which it takes· tor settled and 
immoveable, proceeds to judgment and to the discover-.1 ot 
middle axiOL'IS. And this is now in fashion. The other 
derives axiOES from the senses aI¥i particulars, rising 
by a gradual and unbroken ascent,. so that it arrives at 
the moat general axioms last of all. thia is the true 
~ but as yet untried • • • axiOIDB ~ and order:q 
formed from particulars easily discover the wa:, to new 
particulars, and thus render sciences actiw • • • Ona 
method alone remains to us J which is aimp~ th181 we must 
lead men to the particulars themselves, and their seriea 
and order; llhile men on their side BIDSt force tbamfflvea 
tor awhile to lay their notions aside and begin to fam-
iliarize themselves with the tacts ••• The idols and 
false notions which are now in the poseession ot the human 
understanding ••• not only beset men•s minds that truth 
can hard47 find entrance, but ewn after entrance is 
attained, they will agapln in the very in8tauration ot the 
sciences meet and trouble us, unless men being forewarned 
•• • .fortify themselves ••• They are IDOU> OF THE 
TRIBE • • • IDOLS OF THE CAVE • • • lOOfS OF THE UAR1CET 
PLACE • • • IOOIS Qli' TIIE THEATER • • • 
1. Francis Bacon, '*Aphorisms,,11 Hn¥¥.amnn~ quoted by Burtt• 
~ !:!gJ :isb Pllilosophers from ~ _ ~ P• 8. 
We nmr woul~ li~ ~o look at the tour point.a or Deacar.tesa 
The · f irs t was, never to accept ~ u true · 
when I did not recognize it clearly to be so. that 1a . 
to say, to cle~ :cy. avoid precipitation and prejudice, 
and to include in. wy 9Piniona not.bing beyond t.hat 
wbich should present i~elf so clearly and a,· dia-
tinctzy to my ulind that I Qight have no occasion to 
doubt it. 
The second was, to divide each or the ditficultiea 
which I should present into· as ~ portions as poss- . 
ible and as should be required tor its better solution. 
The ~d was, to conduct my thoughts in order, by 
beginning with the simplest objects, and those JII08t 
easy to know, so as to mount little b,y little, as it by 
steps, to t he . most complex knowledge, and ewn assuming 
an ~rder among t hese which do not naturally precede one 
another . 
. And the last .was' to make everywhere enumarationa 
so complete, and s~ys. s9 wide that I should be sure 
of olili.tting nothing. 
Upon an initi al l"Oading of these points by Descartes, one perceives 
a relationship to the Aphorisms or Francis Ba~,. al.moat one or 
eim·ilari ty. I£ wo remember the biographical background, however, 
and i£ we ret:iember the application of these points to practical 
problems we will realize that they are diametri~ opposed. 
It is true that both Descartes and Bacon urge us to get all 
~ditional concepts and notions out of our ~~ . In the instance 
ot Bacon, this is accomplished by empirical.:q designating the notions, 
and by putting the empirical data into the center of one•a conacioua-
neaa. He uses his four idols to accampllab this. Descartes, howewr, 
removes traditional beliefs by doubting, an intellectual mt.bod. ~ 
distinct~ indubitab:i. certain notions wil.lirbe admitted into our 
thinking. Thus far the negative portion or ~cartes' •thod. The 
l. Rene Descartes Discourse on Uethod., PP• 15-16. ' -----
positive po19tion (the four points) begins lfith the bare Jain1nm 
of the rationally indubitable and moves from there at.ep ror step 
to the remainde1" of trust\'Jortl~r knowledge. 'lh1s method is dia-
metrically opposed to that or Bacon, who inductiveq accumul.atea 
observable data. Descarte~ rather follows the deductive formal 
principle of the oothematiciana. ·l'his is the opinion of Hortbrup.1 
For example, in his desire to begin with the siq,leat objects and 
proceed to the more complex, Descartes aa;ys: 
andt 
I had little difficulty in determining with which 
objects to commence, for I was alread;y persuaded that 
it must be with the simplest and easiest to know and 
consi der-J..ng that f rom all those who have hitherto sought 
truth in t he s ciences, the mathematicians alone have 
been abl e to f ind any demonstrations, tbat ia, any 
certain or evl dent reasons, I did not doubt but that 
such must have been t he rule of their :lnvestigatioms.2 
I commenced w.i th the s implest and most general 
tru.ths, and that _t hus each truth cliacovered was a 
rule available in the discover., ot·subaequent ones. 
Nor in this shall I perhaps appear too vain, it it be 
considered that , as the truth on any particular point 
is one, moever apprehends )bat truth, Imon all that 
on that point can be lmown. · 
We see bow close be appears to came to the inductiw method ot 
Bacon. Actually he is not inductive at all. J.ctnaJly his method 
1a al.ways the deduction or the more complex £raa the simpler and 
more ·easily known. We have a glimpse of his rationalistic method 
when he s~, aBut the chief ground of 1113' oatistaction with tbia 
method• ns the assurance I bad of thereby exercising 1111" BBASClf in 
1. F • Northrup, The Lo ic of the Science& and ~ Huvn1ties, PP• 6-9. 
~. Rene Descartes, brcours"e _!!! Uetli&l, P• -,z. 
3. ~., P• 17 •. 
all. matters, if not llith absolute perfection, at least 111.tb the 
greatest attai.."labJ.e by m.a1 ('l'be italics· are~.) 
11:le cause, ·aa I haw noted,- of this rationaliatic, deductive 
interest on the part of Descartes is, of coune, bis own interest 
in mat.bematics. In the midst of Jesuit dogmatic1am and the con-
sequent narrqr, and inadequate approach to things or a problematic 
nature, he had found bis island or certainty in algebra, , geometr;y, 
and the higher mathematics. He bad decided that this was the 
foundation £or a "loftier superstructure.• 
This view of mathematics is, after a manner, correct, tor 
mathematics (because of its facility for symboli~ representing . . ' 
various aspects of a scientific problem) placed a new emphasis on 
theoretical science. However, the value of mathematics is war in 
this, that its root hods ore valuable to the scientist. As we have 
mntioned be£ ore, the method ~ . relative !2, .'!!! problea and ·~ 
when this ia realized and applied is a i"air aaount or assurance and 
certainty available. Too :cethocl ol LBtJ:lemat.ics is dodu.ctiw, the 
mthod of science is inductive·, the method in art, llhat shall• 
call it1 ••• aesthetically intuitiw?, the method in religion, 
that of faith. Scao novel philosophers have arisen by the confusion 
ot mthods. Some philosophers color t.beir philosophies with the 
r.atbod which best suits ~;.r ends inStead ot recognising the legit,-
. imacy of each method in its proper 'place. Descartes• lliatake was 
tbat or app:cying the mathematical or deductiw met.hod to tba scientific 
or 911p1rical problem. John Dewey tel.ls us, 
l.. Rene Descartes, Discourse !!! _!fe_tb_od_, P• 18. 
Although Descartes defined natural m.stence 88 
extension> the classic tradition that anq aeme and 
imagination, acong the organs of the mind refer to 
physical existence caused hilil to feel bound to otter 
justil'ieation £or the doctrine that scientific pheno-
mena can be stated by purely mathematical reaaoning 
wlthout need of recourse to experimentation. His 
proof £or the existence of God served the purpose ot 
justit,fi.ng tm:s application or mathematical con-
ceptions to physics.l 
So we have noted. the difference between the Bacon1an indu.ctiw 
approach and the Cartesian deductive approach, an approach 11bich 
he arrived at through his interest in mathematical method. 
But let us take a m.ore careful look at Descartes• mat.hod. 
To start w1 th doubt is quite legitimate even in the moat modern 
scientific circles. Larabee points this out when 1n discussing 
doubt, ha sayss 
and1 
A scientist doubts systematically everything 
that goes into his proof. He doubts bis tactsJ be 
doubts his hypothesis J and he doubts whether tbey 
fit to~ether as t hey do • • • be cannot prove in-
ductive:cy that the grip of any of his hypotheses 
upon the fact is absolute; since (1) no human ob-
server is infallible; and (2) no human being's 
lalowledge or all the relevant facts about anythinz, 
let alone, a command of all their ~
patterns, is demonstrably complete. 
Tht:1 sp:JOit, ~f the quest, however, i.s that ot 
systematic doubt. The fertility ·of. science seems 
to rest on an aggressive skepticiam. The question-
ing of everything., the suspecting of ever:, alleged 
conclusion - such things are not. only encouraged, 
but made methodical. concentrate all tbs doubts 
on any single lmowledge claim, Cart'Y them tbroagh, 
and the results will be devastating • • • !be problea 
1s not to £ind an absolute foundation tor arq of our 
ballets• but to discover reasons tor rating one 
above another • • •. It is the essence of the scien-
tific spirit to doubt in order to kDo1' what to be-
li9'99 and not for tho sake ot doW)ting. The scientist 
combines a porpetual suspicion ot the results of . 
others and his· om, 111 th an enhanced confidence 1n ·, 
llhat he accepts for the time being, jut becauae 
it bas survived testing b7 !13 selt-correct.iw 
method of sys~matic doubt. 
And the · Co1umbia Associates state a 11\'ihen. aµ baa been aaid 1n favor 
ot skepticism, it r emains clear that Dllr.l must act~ that scae acts 
are bettm.· than others, and that some basis or discrimination mat . . . 
be used.n2 
Even when the method of doubt bas been employed with regard to 
.. 1 • • 
' . 
a certain problem, ~e same ~thod of doubt i:mat be repeated gener-
ation aft.et" ~eneration in order to perpet~ insure one•~ concepts 
by postulation, that i~, one's mental constructs, and ·their validity. 
For we never lalow i'inaJJy and cosaplete~. Hew facta· conatantq arise. 
And new hypotheses and postulations must be constan~ improvised. to 
express these facts. Our atJl?W:lt. of knowledge 18 conatant.1$ changjng. 
Aa Prof. mu tehead points out1 ·~owl.edge keeps no better than fish.• 
And doubt is the method atill employed to keep a perpetual check on 
the validity of our knowledge. 
The two schools of thought - Bacon and' Descartes as • haw 
~inted out - have too different approaches to the problc or doubt. 
There are echoes of these two schools in contemporary thought1 
Each ( of the authorities on the methods ot logical 
inquiry) maintains that at the beginning one· mat clear 
one•s mind of traditional beliefs. With Bacon, this 
takes the form or specifying the errors of tbs Idols, 
characterizing the usual erroneous traditional belle.ts. 
With Descartes, it takes the rormmot dOllbting all that 
can be doubted. Doubting is also prescribed at tba _ 
initiation of inquiry by Korris Coben and Earnest Ragel. 
and John Dewey. With Morris Cohen and Earnest Hagel 
the fora of doubt is aore Bacon1an and elllJ)irical ~cal.l3' 
character, since they; like Bacon, designate 8_!'I) -. 
certain tram. tional forn11 of belief· which are .. o "" 
, 
l. H. Larabee, Reliable Knowlr~ ~!, 62t627ftlink1ns, P• 21&6. 
2. Columbia Associates, ! Qui _ ,wu,ec ff _, 
c:loubte~ "ohn Dewy•s doubting 1s pemapa JIOl'9 
Cartesian than empirical and Baconian 1n ita fora, · 
since it takes on the positive effort to ·be 
akeptical.l 
. . 
So 11e see that Descartes' 100tbod of doubt bu ~ a very real 
. 
iDtluence on modern science and philosophy. 
. In sumnm.ry 1 w have noted that (~d perhaps this is the major . 
fallacy in the taet,hod of Descartes as applied to science), Descartes 
is rationalistic and mases the signif'icance of the eil;>irical 
approach. We have noted in Descartes• favor that bis method of 
doubt forws one of t he bases of modern science. We should not 
forgot that Descartes' method reminded the acienUat of t.be great 
tool to be had in t he application or mathematics to theoretical 
science. Let us mention one more criticism of Descartes• method. 
John Dewey io the man who more tlmn arq ot.her points out that 
1n the initiation of inquiry is an indeterminate situation. It 111 
. . 
in the ver-~ nature of this indeterminate situation to be questi911-
able. That, is, potenti~ questionable. ActualR', it 1s JD9re'.q 
I 
"uncertain, unsettled and disturbed.• i'bi.s .doubt, Dn8y' ·says, 
(!51ci...!!!:. Theoey ~ Inquiry) not onl.1' exists in a subjec~w 
sense but inheres in the very nature of the situation. ltow, when 
the illdeteroinate situation bec0iil8S subject to inquiry, it becamBs 
wbat Dewey terms, the "problematic situation.• We liDl8t rearnber 
tbat the indetermnate situation is not a part of inquiry• but it 
IS an indispensable precondition. If this is the case. 1Dqu1r)' 
does not begin with doubt, nor with the collecting of f&!=ts, nor 
1. 
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111th tho projuction of eypotboses, but wit.h the problmatic aitu-
ation• Froa there Dewey proceeds to ~18 statement or the probl8II 
and t-ollowo 1rlth other procedures coq>letaq CNtUnea on Borthrup•a 
book. The point bore is that another of Descartes• •ekneeaea 1a 
t.hat be fails to realize the implications or the problematic situ-
ation. "One LlUSt begin not with f11Cts,. nor with Descartes• de-
ductive reasoning, nor with a hypothesis, but with the problea and 
the problemat ic sit.uation, becauoe at the beginning or 1nqu:iry 
tb1s is all t hat one has.al 
Of course, wo don• t want to underoatimate Descartes, Northrup 
not.withstanding. In defense or Doscartes (always remembering that 
bis was an inducti ve xr.athod) we may say three things. First, it 
the world :1.s an or der ly place (as science aasmaea, or at least di~ 
before tho advent of relativity and nuclear p~ics), than it. would 
be logical to assume th.at one could start, w:tt.h the bareat R1n1mm 
of certain knowledge, and, using the Cartesian method, that or pro-
ceeding from simple to coaplsx, even experimenting to increase our 
knowledge, 118 might be able to determine within a reasonable period 
of' time, the nature of our world and perbapa awn ot ourselves. 
But 118 must Qake an exception here. I£ tbe world 1s BOT order~, 
• WOUld run into great difficulty following this deductiw •tbod. 
To criticize Descartes, we might now say that,. uauadng t.bat 
the world IS order,,,. we haven't time to J>l'OC89<l 1n a logical 
J.o,JJ -
manner. Problems confront us 1JDmed1,ately and sOIDBtimaa tbe1' are 
all out 0£ order with the order which logical procedure might 
dictate. Hence., t he import.ance or the problematical situation. 
. . 
And number three, we must remsmbor that even 1t tba world 
. . ' 
. WERE ~r:cy and even if• HAD tho time to roµ.o,r ou.t.. the de-
ductive process or Descartes in t.be enadutian ot our 11Drld, w 
still are confronted with the enormous~ inadequate too~ both 
physical and mechanical which bin~ our ;research. Far aample, 
to examine ;the world deductive~ •ana starting at aaae po1Dt 
and working toward another. In his •tapbyaica, W.. basic point 
is the existence of his own. consciouaness, and conseqwmtq, ot 
h1mael.t. 'lliat would it be in tbe material world? -.. ~ still 
~$~ the chains of sense experience. ~a have ~t fiw organs 
ot perception, and ·the means fo.,:o ~ tbaa (Jllicroacope,, 
telescope, e t c.) are comparatively ~centi discoveries and still 
very inadequa·i;e f or a thorough job. Is there !!lJ,Y observable 
phenomena w'.t1ich could serve as a startine point tar a ·dsductive 
scientific pr ogram? I don•t think sol Of course, Descartes 
I • • 
·1~ · 
J1¥1kes the. •cogi t o/ ergo sum" the starting po~t tor hie meta-
J>lwaics AND his science. But 118 have observe~ and will haw 
occaa~on to observe again later what ~at dift~culv re hmi . 
making the leap from mind to the obje_cti~ existence ot matter. 
Such leaps would be even more plentiful in a ~talq deductiw 
approach to nature. 
Scientific method was still such a D81t' phenCDBD(ll t)Jat 
Descartes .failed to perceive it as a possibility• 1111ch less as 
the foundation upon whi ch the modern world would bQ1ld its 
civilization. As Costello points outs 
Uodern science beean with thought, not with 
obsei1Vation i 1 Galileo,. Doscartes and Hewtan. The 
mistalt..-e ot· Descm'tea in trying to apin a tb8oey ot 
the uni verse out of his head was not that be used 
thought, but that. be overlooked t.he great variety 
of possible alternatives and the weakneas ot the 
h¥UW1 mind in i.Illaginine what these alternati'VeO 
11ere. These are the factors f18,t malm an empirical 
check of•thinking imperative. 
But while we make these criticisms ot Descartes, • muat 
remember that maI\V or the difticulties in hie met.hod arose out 
ot a desire for assurttnco and certainty which coulci un1-v be 
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· grounded in a dedueti ve method sirn:U ar to t.hat ot the ma~ 
tician.:J. Had he been mere~ satisfied with a •thod tor 
achieving cer'Gainty rather than certainty itself', he might never 
havo embarassed h:ilaself from the point of now ot modern science. 
Instead, be ,rould have studied the scientific at.hods ot Galileo 
and Bacon and perhaps have aiTived at a more natural ·and happy 
solution. 
l. Harry Todd Costello, aThe Naturalism ot Frederick Woodbridge,• 
in Krikorian•s I'lo.turilism and tha Human Spirit, PP• Jlh-315. ____ ,__ __ _ 
VII. Criticism of Descartes t lletapb;,vsics 
Cartesian metaphysics is intimately bound up with existence. 
Descartes• object was to find a truth or an ontological nature llhich 
would be verifiable independant of sense experience. 'fb1s places the 
cartesian world into the realm or thoughtJ it seems to have very 
little relation to the real material. world as 1119 know it. Because 
it emanates from the subjective consciousness and because t.ru.t.h tar 
the human being is inextricably related to _sense experience the resul.ta 
are unreal and t heoretical for all their validity,. Lindsay points out1 
The resolution to ignore the probable •ans, the 
ignoring of ·the data or tlle senses, Jlll8D8 that 1lbile 
we can get back to the certainty of existence in gen-
eral, we can have no knowledge ot the individual. For 
the real world is conceived of as purely mathematical 
and without individnality. It becomes increasing~ 
difficult to understand not simp~ what is tbe relation 
betllleen knowle~1Y0 and perception, but how there is arq 
room foT the senses at all.l 
Not onl~l does Descartes• subjectivism seem unreal, but because 
Cartesian certainty emanates from the subjective sell"-consciowmess., 
we have not only the doubt concerning the serviceability of the semse 
but the apparent separation or lilind or thought .tram material th1ngs 
which are the objects of sense experience. Matter in space is shut 
away fra:i thought and thought is quite tigb~ inclosed within itself'. 
Mind seems to thereby become incapable of cmaprebancling 8DY reality 
beside itseli'. 1 Despite the subjectiw unity ot mind and mat~ in 
aeJ.i'-consciousness, the separation seems absolute. unless raiDd ~ 
l. A. D. Lindsay, Introduction to Eftr.Y1D811 ·edition of Descartes,-
P• XV111. . 
t.bought should bocome extended or matter should think. But far 
Descartes; tho ciualism is complete. This is to be ta.Jam u a 
criticism or Descai'tes. 
It is true j. or course,. that Descar1ies solves t.be problem 1D 
hie om mind. There fdUSt be something llb:ich transcends t.be 1.1m1 ta 
of that which is self and that 1'bich is outside of selt. lbat, be 
ask:B• is the point llhere the subjectiw conac1ouneas J>IIS8U out 
into the objecti·11e? The anst.'8r is the connection between the con-
sciousness of self and t he consciousness of God. It is because God 
IS in our minds that we are insured the ontological validity ot the 
objects 0£ sense experience. 
An additional cri ticiam of th.18 dualism ia TOiced by Lindsay. 
Lindsay f eels that, this dualistic principle 1s baaed on t.be miscon-
ception t hat t he mind knows itself more easily than it knolls objects. 
But vbilo t he mind is a p:resuppoai tion or the knolfledge or objects' 
objects to be known are e~ a presupposition of th& uiStence of 
mind.- So he .feels tba·t Descartes bas ovenimplitied bis reasoning 
in this respect. 
Another important phase of Descartes• •tapbys1cs is the •Cogito, 
ergo sum.• The "Cogito, ergo sum• is not • proposition, but an 
entb.Jmeme.. It is not as though w conclude our existence £ram the 
tact t.hat 198 think. This 1'0Uld imply the major premiae· tbat •All 
1'hich thinks is.• It is rat.her a think knOIID of itself, b7 •aiJIIWt 
intuition 0£ the mind .. • The object1oas of ouaendi,. JmleT, even 
Beid and ICant arise· from a construing of the statell9nt 88 • proposition 
instead ot an enthymeme. This, incidental.q, that the two ideu 
rise simul.taneous'.cy',. is the guarantee of the princ1p1At. The one 
1a inevitably contained in the other. 'll;le fact ot rq t.b1nJdng 
~s th? existence or me, the thinker,. Tbe tact or 'lJ13' doubting 
(even 'ff'{/ own existence.) insures the eziat.ence or me. For it 1a 
etUl UY doubting, UY thinking. 
This is also the source of Descartes' certainty, a certainty 
' 
which ~e is able to maintain despite ~e DlliDY errors ~t judgment 
and thinking which man is heir to. Because the 11ill 1s ot ·greater 
extension than the understanding, it sometms· gets Ollt of bounds, 
so to speak. We easily carry it beyond the objecta llhich 118 clear'.cy 
' 
perceive and are often deceived.. '1'base errors are not to be imputed 
to God since they lie inheront in our finite nature. To err is hwlan. 
However, Deacai"tes maintains tbe i"reedom. of man in all his actions• 
Thus error becomes a defect in hia mnner of acting• not in his 
nature. But in our clear intuitions, we do not err. Thus, despite 
error, the £-Tounds for certainty can still be preserved, for the 
c18arest of Cartesian intui t1ons is t.bat I exist. 
There is one more thought in this connection wbich I should 
like to add. Again it has to do with Descartes' separation of 
t.hought and nature. Niebuhr j>Oints outs·. 
Descartes, the fountain soarce ot moc1arD culture, 
manages to conceivu ot man pure~ in t.ems of tbought~-
nature in terms of. machanieftf and to find no organic 
unity between the two, thus beariDg within himNlf' 1 
both the contradictions and extravagances, or aoderniV• 
°'1t oE this dualism comes the •ego• llhich is n~ •teriall3 related 
l.. R. Niebuhr, !1!!, Nature _2! Kan• P• 20. 
to the universe. The question arises as to hos thoughts are 
derived in the ego, or mind. Hume says that Descartes at tb1a 
point is mistaken for he overlooks the importance ot same~ 
caption. Perhaps it, would be simplsst to give ;you Niebohr•e 
exarniuation of this objection verbatim, 
"When I enter most intimately into· what I 
call myself I alua.ys stUiilble on some particular 
perception or other, or heat or cold, light or 
shade, pain or pleasure. I can never catch Jlij"-
self at any t-lne without a porception and can 
never obse:i."VG arzyt,hing but a perception.• (Hume 
Treatise E!! HUlil&l Mature, Vol. I, Part IV, Oh. t) 
This observation oay be regarded as a valid 
eri ticiam of Descartes t conception of the pore 
ego vmich subsists within itself without relations. 
The ~: o is always the center of relations 110 that 
it is porfectzy correct to observe,. •I do not 
ca~h IJ\YSeli' without a percertion.• But Hume's . 
final conclusion, "and carmot observe anything 
but a perception•, is obviously not a logical 
deduction from the f'or!!l9r observationJ nor is it 
according to the £nets. Yet even if Hume were 
correct in his interpretation of the eq>irical 
ego as a stream of impressions it would still be 
pertinent to inquire into the nature of the •v 
which he implies when he s~, "When I enter JDOSt 
intit:iately into what I call J!G'S8li'. 1 It 1s the 
reality of ·the "I" as subject which challenges 
the validity of 8i1 pure]3 empirical interpreta-
tions of the ego. 
SJ 
Despite ?Jiebuhr•s criticism or Hume, it remains one of Descartes• 
great fallacies that in trying to achieve certainty he thereby 
eliminates the data of sense experience. We haw sho1111 with 
Lindsay that t,h:ls makes his world unreal and his proof excellent 
metaphysics but not too practical, and with Niebuhr and Hume that 
tor certainty. 
l. R. Niebuhr, ,!!!! Nature !!£_ ,!!!, P• 286. 
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Hq I add one more .tootnote. I Wnk it 1a 1nt.arwt1ag to / 
noi. t.bat Barth in his tret\tment ot the epiat.emological probla 
rejects the Cartesian maxim •cogito, ergo BUil• and subeU.tutu 
•Oogit.Q.r, ergo sum.0 He holds that th~ knowledge ot selt ia de-
pendent on our lmowledge of God. Aa a bel18'f8r, man is wholly the 
resul.t or the object of faith-God. Hence, being mown, he 1a. 
\lhile this I think bas veey valid implic~tions for t be Christian, 
I e.on•t think it \YOuld satisfy Des~a• quest tor. certainty. In 
. 
the case of Descartes• propos.ition,_, t.he strength ot ~be proposition 
rests on the equation or the two terms.. There ia no such equation 
established bet"fA'.3en "Cogi tor" and •sum•, the relation bein$ one ot 
faith. •cogitor, ergo sum• s~ to be, dom.nan~ 81'llogiat1c. 
Thus it defeats the pun>()Se of Descartes' proposition, to whit, 
certainty. The equation of_ nu being with JV thinking makes rrq 
being indubitable since even the thought which doubts it uists 
as something UDi.qu.ely w:, own, or• m1. In the cue ot Barth, the 
guarantee of my existence rests ou.tside. ot • and makes the nature 
of my reality illocal. This footnote at least has served the 
purpose of turning our attention to, our nut problem, Descartes · 
and his proof for God. 
For Descartes, the finite being is. indetini~ bound up with 
the inf'ini. te. This is not simp'.cy 0%18 or the UIIJZ'IY ideas llhich 119 
have~ It is the idea which is essential to_ our existence 88 
thinJdne beings. Nor is the idea ot God a negative idea for 
Descartes, an, idea arrived at ttirough the negation o£ the finite• 
. . 
ss 
Aa the concept of "darlmess" impllea •light.,• and as "broacP blpUea 
•narrow,• so "finite," implies •rnr1n1te.• Int.hat way our lmowledge 
ot God would come about through the logical dedllction tram the know-
ledge o£ our om limitations. 
Rather, Descartes feels that the inf'inite is much JI01"8 real tor 
. . 
him than the f inite. This knowledge of the infinite 1s in &OIIB 
sense, evon prior to the notion of the finite. How else, he a.alma 
110lll.d he be conscious of his own defects. The conaciowm.ess ot a 
defective nature cannot give rise to the idea ot infinite perfection, 
but rather presupposes it. If we did not have the conaciouanesa ot 
ourselves as finite in relation to the 1ntinite, either w would not 
be cognizant of ourselves at all, or we would be conscious ot our-
selves as infinite. Because we are conscious ot ooraelws as finite, 
119 a.re conscious of the infinite. Descartes• principle is that to be 
conscious of limit is to transcend it. 
In putting bis case in this way, Descartes bas uda the knowledge 
ot God antecedant to his first principle, •Cogito, ergo sum.• For it 
the knowledge of God is antecedant to the idea ot sel.t, lmcnrledge must 
begin where existence begins - with God. Descartes tries to refute 
this ar&rument by pointing- out that be must insure bis aelf'-knowledge 
and his knoll'J.edge of the objects or sense experience b.r the Jmowlec:fee 
that God is not deceittlll but true. This ot coarse does not satis-
tactorily answer the argumnt in a valid fashion. 
However, Descartes has this point ill b1S taTOr~ for what Descartes 
ia reaJ.4r expressing is that beneath and .d all particular trut,ha 
lies the great general truth ot the unit, ot thought and exi&tence•. 
• 
!be ultimate ansl'.er to any attack upon an upect, ot t.rut.h 1a to 
dmaut.rate that tbe wry possibUity ot arri.Ying at truth 1a in-
volved in it. To doubt this argwpent, 1a to doubt reuon itllelt• 
and ·consequently the true God. This contributes to Deecartes • de-
fense by affir'~ that tlle consciousness. or aelt1 1a not at first 
seen to rest on ·ohe consciousness ot God• but that 11ben w aee what 
it means we realize tba.t there it llUST reat. It this 1a the case, 
then something oust be added to the consciousness of salt as the 
first principle - it can oncy be that 118 understand it in a sense 
in 'llhieh ·the consciousness 0£ se.lf is synon;ymous with the conscious-
ness of God. And I think this can be achieved llithin the realm ot 
cartesian philosophy. 
Even however with the establishment or God aa tbe neceasa17 
link bet118en thoueht and being, bet1'88!1 mind and matter, between 
ideas and the objects of sense experience, Descartes repeatedq 
falls back into the old dualism. And ewn if • allow Deacartes 
that unity (established by God), w must aak, what kind of unity? 
IIIU"eq generic?· or is it concrete in which the particular elemnta 
are subordinated but included. Tbese are questions for which -
have no definite ans1ers. 
In considering the place of God in Cartesian philosophy, • 
dare not overlook t he ontological argument. This bas alre&c:\1 been 
stated in a provlous cbapter.. It would seem that tJl81'8 is no rational 
IIIBallS or proving the existen'Ce of God. The cosmological and the 
teleological proofs have been examined in JJlllJ1' tGtboOks on pbilo-
Bopby and the philosophy of religion. In same circlea tb61 are 
maintained with considerable energy. In tbe ajority ot cuee. 
boawr • they are discredited. So is the ontological argwut. 
S7 
This proof holds that ~he existence of God 18 iJll>lied 1n His 
very nature. Being the concept of a perfect being, a being than 
which a greater cannot be conceived, 1 t would be nanseue to deJJ7 
to such a being existence, a necessary attribute or perrection. 
In doi"ining God as "real O we again must allow for bia aistence 
which is a necessm,y implication 0£ or inference baa reality. 
According to Kant. i t is impossible to' prove the enstence ot Oocl 
mere:cy by daf ini tion.
1 
As rjead points ~ta 
It is quite true that the concept .of a ncmx:lstent 
God may be logicalzy' self'-contradictory, and that we 
1DaY' not be o.ble to eonceivo of such a Boi.J:lg except aa 
existing, but 'i.here is all the difference in the world 
between declaring that God cannot be· conceived except 
as existing., and declaring that because., must Wnk 
ot Hin i n terms of existence, He must therefore exist 
independant of our conception •. • • For exmple, if we 
de£ine a c-lrcle as a nclosed plane curve, all points 
or which are equidistant tram the center.," it necesa-
ariq follows that the radii of the circle must be of 
equal length. It does not therefore follow that 
circ~a !JUST exist inclependant of our conception of 
them. 
Or as Fuller points out, •The logical necessity- of a self-consistent 
idea cannot be translated into the logical necessity ot the existence 
of an object corresponding to that idea •• 3 
Descartes• idea is perhaps a little ditterent. Because ,q 
reason conceives Him• God axiats. He exists because ot '1111 per-
ception or infinity whieh coul~ not be aaidst ~ .1!31owledge or rq 
detects unless innately placed there by God. Bot 1mo1r1ng any 
detect• I woul.d either be God, or at least Jiff own cauae. But 9'1811 
1n this ar~nt~ the ontological. proof i8 invo~ftd. · 
· Through the' existooce of God, Descartes bas eatabli•bed the 
validity of himseli'~ of t."ie mat5rial world, or thought. Burtt 
remarksa 
Starting nth the indubitable C8Z"t.ainty or the 
thinking self~ and using arguments a1ndl•r·to &Olllt 
of those emphasized by Augustine and Themas, be -
tablishes the r~al.ity of a divine being suprem1 in 
goodness and perfection. But ~uch a being sure]i 
would not place h:J.s creatures under the control ot 
a· basic deception tbat would rerider their cleanst 
·knowledge illusory. Hence mathematics and mathemar 
tica.l physics gain the certainty which Descartes 
demanded fol" them, but they gain it lFJ becoming· 
grol!iltled ~ t he theolocical metapb3aics o£ Catholic 
traditi on. 
· Wo see n01II', · I think, the subtle combination ot the forces 1D 
the age or Descartes which. brought their influence to plq upon him •. 
He is in a sense a scholastic and yet be is the tat.her ot 11111ch ot 
our contemporar,r scientific thihking. In the t~a ot the spirit 
he brings the forces of rational deduction to prove the aistence 
of OodJ 1n the ~ ot nature, having e~tabliehed their a:iatential. 
status• he brings into play· a method of doabt which is still a basis 
for modern research. In his metapeysics be is charllling and naive, 
~ . 
in his math~~tics he is brilllant and propbatic. He is a great 
. apostle of cEu_....ainty. He showed tlle . w,rld more than 1181V' another 
man how illusive is the quest. 
VIII. Chr"lst:tan Assuranco and Descartes 
Upcpei.mJa1W 
It is quitie true that the existence ot God is to 
be believed S·:i.nco it is taught in the Sacred Script.urea 
and that,,. on the other band, the Sacred Scriptures are 
to be believed because they come i'roe God (for aince 
faith is a gift of Goo, the same Being llbo bestows 
grace to enable us to bell81e other things, can lilm-
wise impart of it t.o enable us to believe bis mm 
existence).l 
S9 
Descartes' interest was to establish t.he ezi.atence ot God tor 
the benefit of our deali11g with sceptics and scoffers. It ia quite 
probable that in thio task he tailed. His other work in pbiloaopb7 
also contributed tmvard a negative religious attitude, as Neva 
• points outi 
Descart.os bad simply wanted to reconstruct theo-
logy lflthout breaking with established dogma. But the 
drift of developw:mt was tonrd absolute divorce. The 
individual in his insist.enee on absolute treedom ot 2 
thought ema.11cipat-ad himself rrom external authority. 
It WOUld seem ~en that theologlcal4' Descartes tailed on every score. 
or course, he is still a sufi'icientl3 important figure 1D philosophy 
and even in Christian thought to irarr&Dt a paper ot this kind it onq 
to exam:t M in greater detail bi& method and his ataJ>b19!.e&• We do 
not want to under-estimate Descartes• Be tocusaed. people's attention 
on aom very basic problem. And be contributed mam;r ideas ot yast 
1. Rene Descartes, lfedi. tations, P• 6S. 
2. J. tleve, History 2!. cbrlst!an Thoyht, II, P• SJ,. 
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izaportance to the field of thought. Die question now to 'be ccn-
sidere~ is. the 1,e;i.at,ion of tho Assur.anc.e or Descartes to Christian 
• # ' • 
Asaurance. 
It is the belief' of tl1e aut.bo~ that one ·nust ·~ diat1n-
guish methods. We have already mantioned the tact that the method 
' .. 
ot science dil'fers radi~ from the method employed 1n the atudi, 
ot the arts. Even within the realm of science itaelt the •thods 
will dii'.ter. Cer'GainJ.¥, the scientist•a approach to physical prob-, 
lams will be complate:cy different .frail b1a approach to the probl.8119 
or sociology or psychology. In some caaea pure induc~on will be 
employe~. In othe1 .. cases the method will be deductive or intro-
spective. In different studies the time for hypothesising will 
vary, the time f 01"' gathering data will Yar:f and the. •thod ot testing 
data wi1;l change. 
The stuey of God is .not a. physical a~~ One· does not gat.her 
data a~t God. It is true one way- gather data concemiDg people •s 
spiritual experiences or concerning differing ethical standar~. 
I 
But God is only inadequately reflected in na~ or 1n the human 
psychology. As Brunner· and many other theologiamJ con~ point 
out, in order to lmow God, God must reveal ~lf • He 1a a Person-
al.it! and t.herefore can only be knOIID by a~-revelation. How it 1s 
true that He is partially. revealed in tbe human Jlind. II.an DOES haft 
an innat.e knowledge of God. But this is not su.tticient for uaurance• 
!be method of stueying God, and it can•t re~ be called• •t.hocl. 
1s b.Y faith. "Faith is the evidence • • • the substallce •. • 
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0£ course, in our study of God, we dare not target that it 1a 
Christ who revea'l s God 'l:,o man. · Christian 838urance is one ot faith 
in Christ. Let us not com:uso, ho-.ever, the •assurance a, faith• 
lli~ 8 C!1ristiau assurauce0 , although tho terms aro of'ton used in tbe 
saa> iooaning. T'ae nassurance of faith• is~ with t.be . . 
certainty .2f ~ salvation. This does not £ind arq place in Descartes. 
Descartes is interested in tho certainty ct existence. That 1s tho 
point' o£ comparison with Christian assurance. Tbe Cbriatian 1a 
certain or assured of God• s existence, but that certainty ia one of 
faith. It is a certainty .founded in satisfied need. Its assurance 
lies o-,.rts:lde of ourselves. It is more like the Bart.bian •Cogitor, 
ergo sum. 11 Existentially speaking, I on]i find liJf&Gl.£ and realise 
nwaeli when I, being conscious or wy desperate need, am drawn to 
God by His Holy Spirit. In a very real sense he •mow• me. It 
1s His personally given self-knowledge which I perceive by faith 
which is IilY' guarar1tea of Bis existence. 
As to the general oortainty which Descartes was seeldng, that 
upon which. he can foumi a ~ practical pbilosopey or life. Thia 
practical philosophy of li£e is guaranteed by our taith in God and 
our knowledge of His doo)jnating love for us. Our assurance in the 
world is again built upon .faith. But it is a faith in sometbiDg 
enacted beyond .2!!!: sphere~ control. Were it within CNr sphere 
ot coniz.01 it would inevitably lack certainty becauae it would be 
at once finite a11d subjective. But salntion being en~ God's 
doing makes it absolute. Ms iS turl,her true be~• _aalvation• 
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has to do 1d t h the renelral. or proper relations wit.h ~ the 
armibil.ation of which was our responsibility. The ottwe aa 
inf1Dite and it required the infinite God and 1ntinite low to 
vicarious]¥ substitute for infinite. ·pumahlll!nt. This tact, that 
it is the Offended who must tl1rougb low forgi:ve1 and tb1e tact., 
tbat the Offended through love DID forgive, ia our turtber USUl"-
ance. Any doctr-.lne muc.ri takes salvation Ol11; or the hands ot God 
and places it into t,tre hands of men, that substitute• 1IOl'ka tor 
grace, destroys the Christian certainty ot fa1t.h. Having such 
certainty the Christian has laid tor him the foundations ot tbe 
ethical. life whose pr"lrae principlo is oolf-less love. Ue can pro-
ci!ed 111th confi dence. The existence or the material world is 
guaranteed f or him because he knows it is tho creation ot God. 
Hor does his l"'eligion hinder the study of the plvaical world with 
whatever oothod can be best adapted to tho particular problematic 
situation.· So, perhaps e can agree with Barth,· tba praclical 
lii'e of t he .Christian is built not on the eertaint7 ot biB own 
ad.stance, but on ·the certainty of Qod•s low. 
One milst hold Descartes suspect. Qie feels that he, a Rmum 
Catholic, felt the same lack of assurance that tbe medieval acho-
laatics found and· tried to elir.dnate tbroUBh reason, t.bat luther 
found and tried to eliminate with 1")rks• Both tailed and in t.he 
end all must fail who do· not understand that the world• liw in 
1a but wry inadequate~ known. We stud;y and • probe, • correlate 
observable phenomena, 118 app]1' our inductiw and deductive •tbods 
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and advance our hypotheses. And in the end our aociarn science 
with a.U of its facts is no l¥>1"C than a set ot antal constructe 
which best explain the observable phenoama at vq particular time. 
U.. tacts require nev theories; ult.imat,e truth ·:1a the moat. ·eluaiw 
' of quests. .wther, failing in works, aight haw 'tried the ll8t.bocl 
' . 
or Descartes and failed again. But be did .. not. Be found certainty" 
t.brough faith in the God who is the · same JUtAtrdat, today' and 
forover. 
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